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I 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The strategic position of the Åland Islands has been discussed 
on several occasions since the islands were demilitarized in 1856. 
At regular intervals the islands and their strategic position have 
caused debate both in Finland and in international forums. During 
the last decade there has been a new kind of debate about Aland, 
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mostly in the Alandic and Finnish media. The debate is in some 
respects similar to the debate in the late 1930's, when there were 
Finnish and Swedish plans on reducing the demilitarization of 
the islands. This time the debate has mainly been initiated by the 
Alandic media, which have questioned the visits of the Finnish 
navy in Alandic waters. The first stage was the "gunboat debates" 
in 1988-1991, on whether the Finnish navy could and should 
move in Alandic waters and whether their presence was necessary 
in the first place. Since 1991 the debates have taken a new turn 
and are now more concerned with the issue of the demilitarization 
of Aland. In this debate various parties have used strategic 
arguments, either trying to prove the need for a military presence 
or questioning this need. But if reference is made to "strategic 
reasons" without further clarification of what these really are, 
the result will be that the arguments become only emotional 
elements in the debate, without factual value. 
"The strategic position of the Aland Islands" requires a 
detailed definition. The concept of strategy has been discussed 
ever since Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831). Often the definitions 
have been very obscure in their attempts to be comprehensive. 
One of the more concrete and understandable definitions is that 
of the American researcher Carl H. Builder: "A strategy is a 
concept for relating means to ends". A change in either ends or 
means, will also lead to a change in strategy. Thus the strategy 
may be dynamic or static, depending on the stability of the ends 
and the means. The strategy may change if new means become 
available or if different ends appear to be preferable.' 
This study is based on the work by major GSO Anders Gardberg in 
preparation for his diploma for the War College in Finland during 1989-1991, 
and it has been supplemented during his scholarship studies at the Armed 
Forces Staff and War College in Sweden in 1992-1994. 
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Even if it may seem tempting to try to analyze what is ends 
and what is means, Builder warns that this temptation probably 
ought to be resisted, as means and ends are relative concepts that 
may easily be confused. Means to Builder include devices, tools, 
power, forces, and pressures for achieving them. The strategy is the 
concept, or the "manuscript", the plan for using these means to 
achieve the end as efficently, advantageously and safely as possible .2 
According to this definition, an end or a means may influence 
the strategic position of the Aland Islands, either separately or 
concurrently. If Aland is the end of the strategy for one party, this 
will affect the islands' strategic position. Even if the islands were not 
an end in themselves, their strategic position will be affected, if they 
are affected by the means used to achieve an end. Thus "the strategic 
position of the Aland Islands" is as dynamic or as static as the ends 
and means affecting the islands. 
The Finnish naval officer and strategist Kullervo Killinen in 
1958 considered that the basic geostrategic factors were the area's 
physical (geography, location, etc.), economic (raw materials, 
industry etc.), and population factors .3 As Aland in these respects 
does not differ from its surroundings, it can be said that Aland does 
not in itself have any great geostrategic significance. The islands' 
strategic position must therefore be seen against the background of 
the strategic position of the Baltic Sea as a whole. 
Aland cannot either be seen as a peaceful enclave, as the 
"Islands of Peace", that have lost their strategic significance thanks 
to their demilitarized position. Regional factors, e.g. the conventions, 
cannot alone change the strategic position of the Aland Islands. The 
strategic position always emanates from external factors, from 
strategic considerations within the Baltic Sea and the countries 
around it. 
"From history we learn that man does not learn from history" 
(G.B. Shaw). True or not, but as historical facts are often used as 
arguments in the debate about Aland, which is entirely justified, it 
may be interesting to begin by finding out what conclusions may be 
drawn about Aland's strategic position in a historical perspective. 
Going on from there it will then be possible to establish what 
relevance the historical experiences might have today and to develop 
different future scenarios which might affect Aland. 
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2 STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
0 
ALAND ISLANDS 1809-1951- THE 
BASIS IS LAID FOR THE 
DEMILITARIZATION AND 
NEUTRALIZATION OF THE ISLANDS 
0 
2.1 The 1856 Convention on the Aland Islands 
Russia conquered Finland, including the Åland Islands, 
during the war in 1808-09. The occupation of the islands 
constituted a direct military threat against Stockholm. During 
the peace negotiations in Hamina in 1809 Sweden's minimum 
demand was the return of Aland. This demand was not satisfied. 
Nor did Sweden have guarantees from Russia that the islands 
would not be used for military purposes.` 
Russia considered Aland to be of vital importance for the 
defence of Finland, and construction of the Bomarsund fortress 
was initiated. The construction work caused alarm in England, 
where the fortress was regarded as a threat against the export of 
tar to England from the towns on the coasts of the Gulf of Bothnia 
and against free shipping in the Baltic Sea.' 
During the Crimean War in 1853-56 England and France 
attacked the Finnish coasts. The countries tried to engage Sweden 
in the war by offering Aland as a reward. Sweden, where the 
foreign policy was led by king Oscar I, was much tempted, but 
held to its declaration of neutrality. Bomarsund was half finished 
and an attractive target for the English and French troops. The 
fortress was taken in August 1854 and blown to pieces. The 
following year Sweden through the so called November treaty 
offered to join the war on the English and French side. But 
shortly afterwards the belligerents began peace negotiations. At 
that stage the Swedish goal was to obtain the Aland Islands. If 
this could not be achieved, then an independent island state 
under the protection of the victor states was to be preferred. As a 
last resort Sweden saw the demilitarization of the islands. A 
demilitarization was also in the interest of England.6 
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Thus a convention was appended to the peace treaty, where 
His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia "in order to oblige the wish 
expressed by Their Majesties the Queen of Great Britain and the 
0 
Emperor of the French" declared that "the Aland Islands will not 
be fortified ...". It is notable that the convention only concerns the 
fortification of the land areas, which are not exactly defined. 
Thus the sea area was not demilitarized. 
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2.2 The Aland Issue in 1917-1921 and its Solution 
Åland remained demilitarized until World War I, with the 
exception of a Russian attempt to place a battalion on the islands.7 
At the beginning of the war, a German landing was considered 
likely. As the German navy was active in the area, Russia began 
to build fortifications on the islands in spring 1915, having 
informed England, France and Sweden of its intentions. During 
two years ten coast artillery batteries were fortified. In addition 
several barracks and maintenance buildings were erected. The 
extent of the fortifications, together with Russia's refusal to honour 
the 1856 convention after the war, caused alarm in Sweden. The 
old threat perception of the "gun aimed at the heart of Sweden" 
was brought back to life.' 
But the situation changed with the Russian revolutions in 
1917. The situation in the Russian garrison of 7 000 or 8 000 men 
was a great cause for anxiety in the islands, which had a 
population of 20 000 at the utmost.' Among the Ålanders at that 
stage awoke the idea of an annexation to Sweden. The situation 
was further complicated by the Finnish declaration of 
independence on December 6,1917. 
When the war of independence broke out in January 1918, 
a white corps, Uudenkaupungin Suojeluskunta (Uusikaupunki 
Civic Guard, UCG) was isolated in Uusikaupunki. The corps 
decided to make its way to Ostrobothnia using the only route 
available, over Aland and Sweden. When UCG came to Aland, it 
started fighting the Russian troops, with the intent of disarming 
them. The fights were intensified when the reds sent 
reinforcements to help the Russian troops. o0 
At the same time a deputation from Aland called upon the 
Swedish king with a plea for help and a wish to annex Aland to 
E. 
Sweden. When news of the fighting in Åland reached Stockholm 
with highly exaggerated reports of genocide, Sweden intervened. 
A strong naval force landed on the islands on February 13, 1918. 
The opinions about the reasons for the Swedish intervention 
differ. In Finland it has been regarded as an attempt of occupation. 
In Sweden the humanitarian reasons have been underlined, and 
the action has been compared to later UN peace-keeping 
operations." In that respect the operation was a success. The 
Swedish force succeeded in breaking off the fighting and an 
agreement was reached about the departure of both white and 
red troops from Aland.12 Negotiations about removing the Russian 
troops were also initiated. A Russian retreat would have left the 
islands totally under Swedish control.13 
The Swedish intervention caused the white government in 
Finland to direct a plea for help to Germany. A German naval 
force landed on March 5, 1918, and took the Russian troops 
prisoner when they were about to leave the islands. The Swedish 
troops remained passive. Within a week the German troops gave 
over the formal command of the islands to the representative of 
the white Finland. The German and Swedish troops departed in 
the summer of 1918, Finland, Sweden and Germany having 
started negotiations about destroying the fortifications. These 
negotiations resulted in an agreement that same autumn.14 
The reasons for the German intervention must be seen 
against a wider background. It was partly intended to increase 
the pressure on Russia during the interrupted peace negotiations 
in Brest-Litovsk. Another reason probably was a German attempt 
to have the white Finland as an ally. In addition, the Aland 
Islands were considered to be well placed as a base for the 
landing in Finland which took place one month later.'' By landing 
on Aland, Germany also increased the pressure on Sweden. 
Germany had earlier offered Aland to Sweden as a reward for its 
entering the war. When Sweden took the initiative in its own 
hands, Germany lost a means of bringing pressure to bear on 
Sweden. At that stage it was feared that Sweden would enter the 
war against Germany.16 
The fortifications were destroyed during the summer of 
1919 under supervision of a commission from Finland, Sweden 
and Germany. But this did not settle the Aland issue. Finland, 
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not having existed as an independent state when the convention 
was signed, refused to acknowledge it, despite having agreed to 
destroy the fortifications." Sweden, on its part, required a 
fulfillment of Aland's demands for a reunion. In a referendum 95 
% of the Alanders had voted for a reunion. In order to restrain 
the Alanders' attempt at secession Finland enacted an Autonomy 
Act for the province in 1920, which was not, however, accepted 
by the Alanders. At that stage the Alanders' leaders were 
imprisoned, accused of high treason, at the same time as the 
Finnish troops on Aland were reinforced. The situation between 
Sweden and Finland became tense, and both countries increased 
their military preparedness. On the proposal of England the 
conflict was transferred to the League of Nations (LN).18 
In the LN both countries considered the islands to be of 
great strategic value for their defence. The LN decided the issue 
of the sovereignty of the islands in Finland's favour in April 
1921. Finland was obliged to guarantee the autonomy and 
minority status of the islands. However, the commission 
considered the islands to be of equal strategic importance to both 
countries.19 In order to solve the conflict, the LN summoned an 
international conference to confirm the 1856 convention. In 1921 
a new convention relating to the non-fortification on the 
demilitarization and neutralization of the Aland Islands was 
signed in Geneva. It confirmed the demilitarization agreed on in 
1856, but it was much more detailed. The area was not only 
demilitarized but also neutralized. The zone of the Aland Islands 
was exactly defined and included both land and sea areas. The 
convention also specified Finland's right to exceptional 
procedures during times of peace and war. Finland was obliged 
to ward off attacks against the islands until the LN and the 
signatories had had time to intervene. Thus the guarantees for 
the neutralization of the islands were rather complicated and a 
unanimous decision in the LN was needed for the decision to 
enter into force. At a 2/3 majority in the LN the signatories were 
entitled to intervene in case of a conflict. But the greatest drawback 
of the convention was that Soviet Russia was not permitted to 
take part in it. When the convention had been signed, Soviet 
Russia, which at that time was not a member of the LN, announced 
that as far as they were concerned, it did not exist.20 Thus the 
convention was insufficient from the very beginning. 
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2.3 The New Åland Issue in the 1930's 
The 1921 convention made it possible to normalize the 
relations between Finland and Sweden. Inofficial cooperation 
between Swedish and Finnish military circles for the defence of 
Aland began already in the middle of the decade.21  
The strategic significance of the Aland Islands increased 
during the 1930's. As a result of Germany's strengthened position 
as a great power in the Baltic Sea area, the Soviet Union increased 
its military activity in the Baltic Sea. Both Sweden and Finland 
feared a race between the Soviet Union and Germany for the 
unfortified islands. By occupying the islands both could have 
brought pressure to bear on Sweden as well as on Finland. The 
German transports of ore from Northern Sweden through the 
Gulf of Bothnia could either be guaranteed or threatened, 
depending on who controlled the islands. Aland was situated 
between the power centres of the two great powers and could 
thus have constituted an advanced attack position for both parties. 
The confidence in the 1921 convention decreased concurrently 
with the diminishing authority of the LN. The Soviet Union had 
never acknowledged the convention and Germany left the LN in 
1933.22 
Under these conditions Finland and Sweden started 
negotiations about a joint defence of the Aland Islands.'3 The 
negotiations resulted in the so called Stockholm Plan in January 
1939. According to this plan Finland and Sweden would respect 
the 1921 convention to the extent that it was possible. But the 
islands were to be protected against a surprise attack. The two 
countries drew up a joint defence plan, permitting Finland to 
fortify the islands south of the southern tip of Lemland. These 
fortifications would have linked the Swedish and Finnish coast 
artillery positions, creating a network reaching from the 
Stockholm archipelago to Hanko.21 The plan also included 
compulsory military service for the Ålanders, to be done on the 
islands only. The plan met with considerable opposition among 
the population on Aland. Despite the opposition, the plan was 
submitted to the LN for approval, as it was not in accordance 
with the 1921 convention. The signatories did not go against the 
plan, but the Soviet Union opposed the fortifications. Foreign 
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Minister Molotov claimed that the Soviet Union had greater 
interest in the islands than Sweden, and thus opposed that 
Sweden, but not the Soviet Union, should participate in the 
defence of the islands. Molotov considered that the worst 
alternative was that the fortified islands were to be occupied by 
an enemy power (i.e. Germany). As a result of the Soviet 
opposition Sweden decided to postpone the plan for the time 
being." 
The reasons for the germinating defence co-operation has 
been the subject of lively debate. Finland had since 1935 
proclaimed a Nordic trend in its foreign policy. It was of Finnish 
interest to have Sweden as a military ally. But such an alliance 
met with practical problems. In the late 1930's Sweden regarded 
Germany as the greatest threat, while Finland saw the threat 
coming from the Soviet Union. Under such conditions there 
would have been few points of common interest for a military 
alliance. Aland was, however, one such point. It is a general 
opinion that Finland was trying to bind Sweden to military co-
operation and possibly to an alliance through the Aland issue.26 
The Soviet opinion on the fortification of the Aland Islands 
had become known during negotiations as early as in 1938. The 
Soviet Union had at that time declared that co-operation was a 
condition for its approval of the fortification works.27 There are 
problably two reasons for the Soviet opposition. One is the reason 
given by the Russians themselves: fear that an outside power 
(Germany or England) might use the islands as a bridge-head in 
an attack against Leningrad. This does not exclude another theory, 
according to which the Soviet Union tried to establish its sphere 
of interest as early as 1938-39 by its acting in the Aland issue. By 
opposing a joint defence, the Soviet Union tried to isolate 
Finland.28 The events before and during the Winter War give 
strength to this theory. 
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2.4 Aland during the Winter War and Continuation War 
Åland was not discussed during the negotiations in Moscow 
in October 1939, possibly because of the islands' great importance 
for Sweden, too.29 At the outbreak of the Winter War, the Soviet 
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Union declared the Finnish coasts to be under blockade, but left 
Aland outside the blockade.30 Also these factors give strength to 
the theory that the Soviet Union was careful not to give Sweden a 
reason to enter the war. 
Finland moved troops to Aland on December 1, 1939, after 
the outbreak of the Winter War. The acts of war against Aland 
were limited to a few air raids. After the arrival of the Finnish 
troops, a volunteer corps, Alands Hemvärn (the Aland Home 
Guard), was set up to complete the defence. Enrolment in the 
corps was large, at most it had 1810 members. From the beginning 
of March 1940, the Aland Home Guard alone took over the land 
defence and thus Finnish troops could be disengaged and sent to 
the Karelian Isthmus.31  
After the outbreak of the war, Finland once more tried to 
get military help from Sweden. Mannerheim among others in 
March 1940 suggested that Finland should offer the Soviet Union 
a base on Aland instead of Hanko, in order to bring pressure to 
bear on Sweden to contribute with military help. But the Soviets 
had anticipated this move by already in January offering Sweden 
advantages regarding Aland, as a prize for staying out of the 
war. In this way they wanted to make sure that Finland remained 
isolated. Sweden avoided negotiations with the Soviet Union 
about Aland. But the Soviet proposition eliminated Finland's last 
card for getting help. Thus the proposition had the intended 
effect.32 
After the Winter War the troops were not discharged from 
Aland. After the German attack against Norway and Denmark, a 
German invasion on Aland was feared, as this might have 
safeguarded the transports of ore from Sweden.33 Troops from 
the Karelian Isthmus were moved to Aland instead of of being 
disbanded. At the end of April the garrison on Aland was at its 
maximum strength since the outbreak of the war. The threat 
diminished due to the rapid fall of Norway. The high level of 
preparedness gave rise to protests among the local inhabitants, 
especially as the troops to a large extent consisted of volunteers 
from Aland. It has been suggested that the confirmation of the 
remilitarization was an attempt to quash the convention from 
1921.'' 
The military presence in Åland also gave rise to Soviet 
protests. The Soviet Union considered that the presence of the 
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troops was aimed against itself and in the summer of 1940 
demanded do be allowed to participate in the defence of the 
islands. As an alternative a demilitarization of the islands could 
come into question. Also otherwise Finland was under heavy 
Soviet pressure, i.a. in the Petsamo issue. In military circles the 
threat against the islands was considered no longer to be 
imminent. At that stage it was decided to give in to the demands 
for demilitarization, though only after lengthy negotiations about 
the wording of the convention and its relation to the 1921 
convention. In the end this relation was left undefined.35 On 
October 22, 1940 a treaty on the demilitarization of the islands 
was signed in Moscow. 
The treaty is fairly similar to the 1921 convention, but it 
only concerns the demilitarization of the islands, not their 
neutralization. The most important addition was a prohibition 
against putting the islands at the disposition of the armed forces 
of foreign states. This prohibition was a logical consequence of 
the Soviet isolation policy and it thwarted the most recent 
negotiations about a Swedish-Finnish defence of the islands.36 In 
addition, the Soviet Union was permitted to set up a consulate in 
the islands to supervise the demilitarization. 
After the demilitarization, Aland's position was threatened. 
The Soviet bases in Hanko and the Baltic countries made a surprise 
attack possible. The consulate in Mariehamn was seen as a 
camouflaged reconnaissance party for an inasioh.37 It was also 
feared that the Soviet Union would try to break off the Finnish 
trade connections to the west. When the relations between Finland 
and Germany improved in the winter of 1940-41 and the first 
joint military plans were made, also the defence of the Aland 
Islands was considered. During the negotiations, on January 30, 
1941, General Heinrichs suggested that Germany might occupy 
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Aland, so that Finland would have a valid reason to mobilize. 
The Finnish fears of a Soviet invasion of Aland have proved 
to be, well-founded in the light of recently discovered sources. 
According to detailed operative plans, found in the archives of 
the Baltic Fleet, the Soviet Union was preparing for an invasion 
in the autumn of 1940. The purpose of the operation was to 
strengthen the defence of Leningrad against a German occupation. 
The operation envisaged that Sweden would intervene in case of 
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a Soviet occupation. Consequently the attack would be launched 
with a landing on Eckerö, to prevent Swedish intervention.39 As 
early as in spring 1939 Germany, too, had prepared similar plans 
of its own to occupy the islands, and these plans were maintained 
until the autumn of 1944. 0 
The Finnish plan for the occupation of Aland in case of war 
was thus named "Sailing Race", which was hardly a concealing 
name. Also Sweden had its own plans for occupying the islands.41  
When Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, 
Operation "Sailing Race" was already under way and the 
detachment was awaiting confirmation of the outbreak of war at 
the provincial border. Overnight 5000 men with equipment and 
69 cannons were transported to the islands on 23 vessels. With 
the exception of a Soviet air attack the operation went well. The 
timing clearly shows that there had been coordination of Finnish 
and German operations." 
During the Continuation War the acts of war against Aland 
were limited. The main reason for this probably was that the 
Soviet navy at an early stage was locked into the innermost part 
of the Gulf of Finland. But during the autumn of 1941 Aland 
played an important part in the naval strategy in the Baltic Sea. 
The German supreme command counted on that the Soviet Baltic 
Fleet "Baltflot" would attempt to break through to neutral 
Sweden. The German strategy was to try to "smoke out" Baltflot 
into the Baltic Sea and to sink it there. For this task the largest 
squadron ever in Finnish waters was gathered in the Aland 
archipelago to lie in ambush. The German "Baltenflotte", as the 
squadron was called, in all comprised more than 20 vessels, 
among them the prides of the German navy, the battleships 
Tirpitz and Admiral Scheer. However, the German attempts at 
smoking out the Russian fleet were too efficient and had the 
opposite effect; Baltflot suffered so great losses that it could not 
with the best will put to sea. The German squadron sailed from 
Aland on September 25, having waited for two days.43 The 
operation still shows that great strategic importance was attached 
to the Aland archipelago. The incident is not likely to pass 
unnoticed in the strategic planning of Russia today. 
German interest in the Aland Islands did not cease with 
the confining of the Soviet fleet to the innermost part of the Baltic 
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Sea. The next time the islands were included in German plans 
the target was a different one: Sweden. In the spring of 1943 
Operative Studie "Schweden" was drawn up, aiming at an 
occupation of Sweden.' The main attack would be launched 
from Norway against Östersund in the north, and against 
Stockholm over Falun in the south. The southern operation 
required landing with an armoured division from Finland over 
the southern part of the Kvarken straits in Oregrund, for an 
attack against Stockholm from the north. The operational plan 
gives further proof that the fears of Aland being "a loaded gun" 
aimed at Stockholm were well founded. Also the Soviet Union is 
said to have harboured plans of an attack against Sweden during 
the war, and also their plan involved Aland 45  
2.5 Re-introduction of the Demilitarization 
When Finland and the Soviet Union negotiated about an 
armistice in September 1944, Mannerheim instructed the Finnish 
negotiators to offer Aland as a base instead of Porkkala. The 
Finns never put this suggestion forward, as they realized that 
Porkkala was an absolute demand According to the armistice 
agreement the 1940 treaty re-entered into force. 
In case Finland should make a separate peace with Russia, 
Germany had in the autumn of 1943 made up the naval plan 
"Tanne" to safeguard its interests in the Baltic Sea. The plan was 
twofold: "Tanne Ost" to conquer Hogland and "Tanne West" to 
conquer Aland. In addition, there was a plan "Tanne I", involving 
the conquest of Aland by means of landing airborne troops. The 
two latter alternatives were considered to be the most important.47 
But when Finland made a separate peace with Russia, Germany 
gave up these plans, mainly from fear of countermeasures from 
Sweden Also, the Finnish defence on Aland had been reinforced 
and at the time of the armistice it was prepared for an attack. 
"Tanne Ost" was carried out in an improvized manner, but it 
failed, due to unexpected Finnish resistance. German naval forces 
were also sighted outside Aland, but the operation was mainly 
intented to protect German vessels leaving the Gulf of Bothnia.} 
The German plans still had the effect that the dismantling 
of the coast artillery forts was stopped. In December Mannerheim 
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proposed Finnish-Soviet co-operation for the coast defence in the 
Gulf of Finland.5° The Swedish government was alarmed by the 
Finnish plan to offer Aland to the Soviet Union.51 The information 
about the suspension of demilitarization in turn alarmed the 
English War Office.52 England supposed that Finland belonged 
to the Soviet sphere of interest. Thus a fortified Aland in Russian 
hands would be extremely detrimental for the defence of Sweden 
and Scandinavia. The English War Office decided to try to 
counteract a remilitarization. It was, however, considered that 
"it would appear profitless to press for a policy of demilitarisation 
once it has become plain that Russia ... favours the reverse".53  
The events preceding the Peace Treaty in Paris are still partly 
unknown. But in the treaty it was stipulated that the Aland 
Islands would "...remain demilitarized in accordance with the 
situation as at present existing." In the light of these sources it 
seems likely that the demilitarization decision was made in the 
interest of the Western powers and Sweden. 
At the end of the 1940's a revision of the Aland Autonomy 
Act was being considered. In this connection the so called 
Guarantee Act from 1922 was also to be amended. This act 
contained stipulations about mediation from the LN in disputes 
between Finland and Aland concerning the autonomy. As the 
LN no longer existed, there were plans for an international 
guarantee system, possibly based on the UN. The Soviet Union 
protested against these plans, insisting that Finland should be 
responsible for the sovereignty of its own territory. They claimed 
that the act would entitle foreign powers to interfere in internal 
Finnish affairs. The Autonomy Acts were passed in 1951 without 
international guarantees.' 
0 
2.6 Main Factors Influencing Aland's Strategic Significance - 
Conclusions and Problems 
0 
The strategic significance of Aland has most often been a 
result of the islands' geographic position. From them it has been 
possible to block the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia, or to threaten 
shipping in the northern Baltic Sea. Due to the central position of 
the islands they have constituted a possible threat against both 
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Finland and Sweden - or a cornerstone in the defence of these 
countries. 
Throughout history a pattern is visible: Naval units based 
at the Bomarsund fortifications could in the 19th century have 
prevented English trade with the towns on the coast of the Gulf 
of Bothnia and threatened free shipping in the northern Baltic 
Sea. A militarized Aland in enemy hands could have been a 
springboard in an attack against Sweden. From the islands it 
could during the Second World War have been possible to prevent 
German ore transports from northern Sweden, or to close 
Finland's only trade route by sea during the wars. The list could 
be longer, but the pattern is the same: the strategic significance of 
the islands has most often been due to a potential threat that one 
party would use the islands against somebody else. In order to 
estimate the islands' strategic signficance it is therefore necessary 
first to find out what today's threat-perceptions are. 
The demilitarization and neutralization decisions have been 
made on the basis of the same potential threat. In situations 
where the possession of the islands has been the cause of a 
conflict, or when the interests in the islands have diverged, 
demilitarization has been used as a means to stabilise the situation. 
The intention has been to prevent one party from taking advantage 
of the potential threatening position of the islands, and to avoid a 
situation where the possession of the islands might upset the 
military balance. Thereby a new factor for Aland's strategic 
position was created. 
The basis for the demilitarization and neutralization of 
Aland was laid during the 19th century and during the first half 
of this century, to counteract the perceived threats of the periods. 
Since then many of the factors influencing the strategic position 
of the Baltic Sea have changed. Not least the factors involving 
weapons technology are entirely different today. Do the 
stipulations on demilitarization and neutralization still have the 
effect they were originally intended to have? Can the conventions 
today be considered to prevent anyone from threatening anyone 
else via Aland, or can the stipulations on the contrary increase 
the possibilities for this? Do the conventions limit today's weapons 
systems, or can the purposes for the restrictions concerning mobile 
weapons systems be circumvented? An entirely different question 
is, whether the AIand Islands have any strategic significance at 
all, the weapons technology being what it is today. 
During the Finnish independence Aland has had a twofold 
significance for Finland. Partly it has been a question of authority, 
partly of military security. The separatism in Aland was regarded 
as treason during and after the war of independence, despite the 
starting points being similar to those of Finnish independence.55 
The Aland issue became a question of authority both in Aland 
and in Finland. Thus the autonomy for the Aland islands was in 
many circles in Finland seen as a limitation to the sovereignty of 
the new state. The settling of the conflict between Finland and 
Sweden through the Geneva convention in 1921 was seen as a 
further limitation, while in Aland it was seen as a complement to 
the autonomy. This linking impeded the proposals to revise the 
convention in the 1930's, as the efforts were also seen as an 
attempt to strengthen Finnish sovereignty. But the main reason 
for the proposed revision was the fears held by Finnish (and 
Swedish) military authorities, considering the prospect of having 
to defend the islands against a surprise attack without advance 
preparations. The arguments used in the debates in the late 
1930's are in many ways similar to those heard today. What is 
then the background of the debates today? Have the conventions 
become part of Aland's autonomy? In that case, how significant 
is the autonomy for the strategic position of the area? This question 
should also be asked from the Finnish point of view. Are the 
conventions considered to have a limiting effect and, if so, is this 
due to an implicit need to strengthen Finland's feeling of 
sovereignty or to a real need to make the defence of the islands 
more effective? 
Aland has been very important to Sweden ever since 
Sweden lost the islands. Sweden's actions from 1809 onwards 
follow an interesting pattern. At least until 1921 it was considered 
that the best solution would be to reunite the islands with Sweden. 
Failing this, it was preferable if the islands were independent or 
under a friendly power that could guarantee that the islands 
were not used against Sweden. The third possibility was a 
demilitarization of the islands. The demilitarization decisions in 
1856,1921 and probably also 1947 were based on Swedish security 
claims. During the period 1918-1921 Sweden did not trust in 
Finland's capability to prevent attacks against Sweden via the 
islands. In 1947 it was presumed that Finland belonged to the 
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Soviet sphere of interest. Thus demilitarization was seen as a 
safer alternative than the Finnish-Soviet fortifications that could 
be feared. This line of reasoning leads to one interesting question: 
In the 1930's Sweden preferred to trust in Finland rather than in 
the neutralization convention. What then is Sweden's present 
attitude to the demilitarization and neutralization of Aland, 
considering the good relations between the countries? 
As a result of Aland's importance for Sweden other powers 
have also bargained about the islands, in order to bring pressure 
to bear on Sweden. Before the Crimean War England and France 
offered Sweden the islands as a reward for its entrance in to the 
war. During the First World War Germany in its turn tried to do 
the same. Before and during the Winter War Finland tried to 
force Sweden into the war by offering the islands to the Soviet 
Union. The Soviets, on their side, probably tried to prevent 
Swedish entrance into the war by offering them the islands. But 
apart from the November treaty in 1855, Sweden has never let 
the islands influence its most important decisions. 
The visible significance of the islands has most often been 
most important as a means of bringing pressure to bear on 
Finland, Sweden or a third party. One of the main reasons why 
the Soviet Union did not start hostilities against Aland during 
the Winter War probably was that they did not want to give 
Sweden a reason to enter the war on the Finnish side. It is equally 
likely that the Swedish interest helped to protect Aland from a 
German attack in the autumn of 1944. If these assumptions are 
true, it can be said that the Finnish and Swedish defence plans 
for the islands before the war had the intended effect, even 
though they were not carried out. An interesting question is, 
whether the interests of Sweden (or some other external power) 
might still protect the islands. An opposite question might be: Is 
there a risk that Aland could be drawn into a conflict because of 
the islands' importance to Sweden (or some external power)? 
Aland has been of considerable importance to Russia/the 
Soviet Union. Both the Bomarsund fortifications and the 
fortifications during the First World War show that Aland was 
seen as flank threat against Russia's Baltic coast. Both in 1939 and 
in 1940 the Soviet Union maintained that it had greater interests 
in Aland than Sweden did. The Soviet attack plans against Aland 
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in the autumn of 1940 confirm this interest. If the attack had been 
carried out successfully, it might have changed the strategic 
positions in the entire Baltic Sea. Thus the attack was probably 
cancelled out of consideration for the interests of the German 
ally. But the German plans of an ambush against the Soviet Baltic 
Fleet from Aland in the autumn of 1941 prove that the fears of 
the islands being used against the Soviet Union were well-
founded. As the strategic positions in the Baltic Sea now resemble 
those of the 1930's, the question is what influence this has on 
Aland's importance for Russia. 
Aland's significance for the other states in the Baltic Sea 
area, mainly Germany, has varied, depending on the prevailing 
situation. Before the Second World War Germany estimated that 
it would be best if Finland itself could guarantee that the islands 
did not constitute a threat against German interests. To be on the 
safe side, an occupation plan was prepared, to enable Germany 
to take matters into its own hands, if necessary. '6 During the war 
the islands offered a sheltered base area for attacks against the 
Soviet Union and for safeguarding sea transports, i.a. transports 
of ore in the northern Baltic Sea. Aland's significance might have 
been greater unless first Germany and then the Soviet Union had 
had naval supremacy. In a more equal situation the islands might 
have become a battleground both in the summer of 1941 and in 
1944. What role could the islands today play for Germany, NATO 
or its possible successor, if a conflict in the Baltic Sea were to 
arise? 
In order to answer these questions we must on the one 
hand look at possible strategic developments in the areas close to 
Aland during a foreseeable future, and on the other analyze 
what significance Aland could in the future have in various 
possible military operations, considering the strategic and military 
technological development. 
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3 TRENDS AFFECTING THE 
STRATEGIC POSITION OF 
NORTHERN EUROPE AND THE 
BALTIC SEA 
Strategically, Åland should always be seen within a larger 
context, Northern Europe .and the Baltic Sea. Despite all 
demilitarization decisions, Aland cannot be evaluated as an 
exclusive zone, independent of the world surrounding it. Aland 
represents a small part of the strategic position of the Baltic Sea 
and Northern Europe. During the last ten years several of the 
factors involved have changed completely, changing the situation 
in Northern Europe. The strategic position of the Baltic Sea 
remained more or less constant from the late 1940's to the end of 
the 1980's. The focus was on the southern parts of the Baltic Sea 
and the straits of Denmark. This was considered to reduce 
Finland's strategic significance as a buffer state between the 
great powers. 
As a result of the detente, the subsequent disarmament 
decisions and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the strategic 
situation in Northern Europe changed. This formed the basis for 
an entirely new strategic situation in the Baltic Sea. The 
consequences of this new situation cannot be fully established 
yet, but some development trends are discernible. 
3.1 Trends in Russia 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union further changed the 
strategic position of the Baltic Sea that had begun with the Soviet 
withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Thus Russia is now almost in 
the same position as the Soviet Union in the 1920's and 1930's, 
with the exception of the bases in Kaliningrad. In addition, Russian 
military activities are hampered by economic problems. Within 
many circles in Russia there is widespread dissatisfaction with 
the humiliation of the former great power. Thus it is likely that 
Russia will take a more active part in foreign policy in the future. 
After the attempted coup in 1993 the Russian military is also said 
to have gained considerable influence over the foreign policy.57 
There are indications of this greater influence in the new Russian 
military doctrine, making explicit mention of Russian interests in 
the development in "near abroad" countries. The operations in 
Chechenya also showed that the use of military power to solve 
conflicts has not been ruled out. 
The future of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), created to replace the Soviet Union, is uncertain. Several 
member states, among them Ukraine, has wanted to free itself of 
Russian dominance. The disputes between Russia and Ukraine 
about the Black Sea Fleet and the Crimea are early examples of 
risks of internal disputes within the Commonwealth, which may 
in the long term result in conflicts. But the years of Soviet planned 
economy makes it economically difficult for the former Soviet 
republics to go their own way. The question of joint armed forces 
has met with opposition among several member states. The plans 
for joint CIS military forces, including both conventional and 
nuclear arms forces, have not been carried out. The Russian talk 
of "near abroad" countries has been interpreted as an indication 
that Russia strives to re-establish a hegemony over the other CIS-
states, similar to the Soviet rule. Using diplomacy, economic 
pressure and participation in military operations Russia has 
gained a dominant position over the other CIS-states.58 The 
attempts to forcibly counteract the internal Russian disintegration 
can be regarded as a complement to this policy. 
The Russian withdrawal from the Baltic States was carried 
out according to plan, despite contradictory information and 
threats of discontinuing the withdrawal. But considerable risks 
of frictions remain in the relationship between Russia and the 
Baltic Republics. Statements about Russian interests in the "near 
abroad" countries have in the Baltic States been taken as a threat 
to their independence. The demand for a demilitarization of 
Kaliningrad59 put forward by the Baltic States is not likely to 
improve the relationship between Russia and these states. In a 
study that attracted much attention the Russian Captain (Navy) 
A. Demtshenko predicted that a consequence of a Russian 
withdrawal would be an advance of NATO-bases into the Baltic 
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States.60  Even if the scenario does not seem credible, it is an 
indication of the attitudes among the Russian officers, who do 
not rule out the possibility of a new cold war within 15 years.61 
Thus it is possible that Russia might again attempt to regain 
its former position in Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea. The 
success of the extremist politician Vladimir Zjirinovskij in the 
Russian parliamentary elections in December 1993 indicates that 
a democratic development in Russia will not necessarily reduce 
tension in the neighbouring areas. Even if the relations between 
Russia and the Baltic States do not deteriorate into an open 
conflict, Russia might use marine operations in the area to put 
pressure on the Baltic States, e.g. under the pretext of preventing 
illicit traffic. 
Regardless of whether it is the CIS or Russia that will 
inherit the Soviet security interests in Northern Europe, it is 
evident that the Baltic Sea will play an important part in its 
security system. The present development in Russia will increase 
the significance of the Kola Peninsula considerably, as the nuclear 
forces are concentrated to the Northern Fleet. The significance of 
the nuclear weapons is likely to remain unchanged for the Russian 
security, and to constitute her ultimate deterrence. The new 
Russian doctrine has abandoned the restriction not to be the first 
to use nuclear weapons.62 It has been calculated that more than 
50 % of the Russian strategic nuclear weapons will be based on 
the Kola Peninsula by 2003, all within the framework of the Start 
II agreement 63 A likely result of this is the considerable increase 
in the number of units that have been moved from Eastern 
Europe to the vicinity of the Kola Peninsula - and Finland -, even 
if the purely practical reasons that have been given for the basing 
may have played a part. As a result of the increase of troops in 
the area, the flank limitations in the CFE treaty make it more 
difficult to station units in Russia's Northern (formerly Leningrad) 
Military District, as also the military districts in the Caucasus are 
included in the flank limitations. Thus unrest in Caucasia may 
indirectly influence the strategic situation in the neighbourhood 
of the Baltic Sea" But a rewording of the CFE treaty, as proposed 
by Russia", would be detrimental to the security in Europe as a 
whole, as it might lead to further demands for amendments, and 
thus put the implementation of the entire treaty at risk.6  
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Thus it is still in the Russian interest that the areas in Northern 
Europe will not be available to a third party in an attack against 
their most vital defence areas: the bases on the Kola Peninsula and 
St. Petersburg. These factors indicate that Fennoscandia's strategic 
significance will not diminish. As the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of 
Finland reach deep into the heart of Russian territory, this may 
require installation of early warning systems in the area. At the 
same time there is a risk that the strategic significance of the Gulf of 
Finland and the Aland Islands may increase. 
An important factor in the strategic position of the Baltic Sea 
is the Kaliningrad oblast and its future role in the Russian defence. 
The American researcher Phillip A. Petersen has noted that the 
militarization of Kaliningrad changed Finland's strategic position 
from "frontier state to flank" 67 Inversely, it might be said that a 
Russian retreat from or demilitarization of Kaliningrad would 
reverse the situation. The main part of the Baltic Fleet's dock capacity 
is already located in the Gulf of Finland. Today it is likely that 
Kaliningrad's significance will decrease due to the vulnerable 
position of the bases in a crisis. Thus it is likely that the Russian 
marine will increase its basing in the Gulf of Finland even further, 
even if the Kaliningrad bases are not given up. This would enchance 
the strategic significance of the Gulf of Finland and Aland. 
Also the communications between St. Petersburg and 
Kaliningrad would be endangered in a crisis. The development of 
today's conventional weapons systems has given better performance 
and accuracy in firing. With increased accuracy the vital problem is 
not hitting the target, but finding it. This development will probably 
have as a result that a supremacy in numbers will instead signify 
greater vulnerability, making large mobile operations impossible in 
case of a conflict. 68 This increases the significance of the sheltered 
archipelago areas in the Baltic Sea, including Aland. 
The withdrawal from Eastern Central Europe and the Baltic 
States has enhanced St. Petersburg's significance for Russia's 
economy and foreign trade. At the same time the northern Baltic 
Sea and the Gulf of Finland become more important as a trade 
route. A threat against these connections would at the same time 
constitute a threat against vital Russian interests. 
Also in other respects the Baltic Sea has changed in 
significance for Russia. Having been almost an "inner sea" it has 
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now become a potential front line. An indication of this is e.g. 
that NATO has extended its northwestern flank, AFNW (Allied 
Forces Northwest) as far as the Gulf of Finland. Although the 
threshold for a major power conflict in the area has been raised 
radically since the 1980's, this "threshold" is now considerably 
closer to Finland and the Aland Islands. As a result, the Russian 
military interest in the area is likely to remain. Despite the decline 
of the Russian Baltic Fleet today, there is much to indicate that in 
the long term Russia may regain a large part of its lost impetus in 
the Baltic Sea.69 
To summarize, the future Russian interest in the Baltic Sea 
might be: 
- to make it impossible for a potential attacker to threaten 
Russian territory or vital interests (i.a. St. Petersburg and the 
Kola Peninsula, but possibly also operations in "near abroad" 
countries) 
- to apply pressure on the Baltic States by means of an 
aggressive show of force in the Baltic Sea 
- to demonstrate to the world at large that Russia is capable 
of protecting its connections with Kaliningrad 
- to compensate the loss of the Baltic States with a ship-
based anti-aircraft defence and marine surveillance 
- to retain the possibility of using the Baltic Sea as a 
springboard in an attack in a westernly direction. 
It is often said that the strategic focus in the Baltic Sea has 
moved northwards. This means not only that the significance of 
the northern Baltic Sea will increase, but also that to Russia it will 
remain very important to be able to operate in the entire Baltic 
Sea. The one overshadowing need for Russia is still to have free 
access to the Baltic Sea. Therefore the significance of the northern 
Baltic Sea has increased in comparison to the situation in the 
1980's.7° 
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3.2 Trends in the European Security System 
The political situation in Eastern Europe constitutes another 
uncertainty for the strategic position of the Baltic Sea. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact brought 
about a dissolution of a collective security system between the 
states in Eastern Europe. At the same time the military balance 
became more complicated compared to the time of clear groupings 
into blocs. The risk for minor conflicts may increase when an 
escalation between the blocs is no longer imminent. Also the 
ethnical problems and an aggravation of the nationality problems 
may result in limited conflicts. 
The new freedom of action has resulted in an increased 
activity to create new security structures without a new bipartition 
of Europe. A number of organizations have been engaged in this 
development. The actors have included i.a. the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), its co-operation organization 
NACC, the European Union (EU) and its defence organization, 
the Western-European Union (WEU). 
The OSCE has contributed to a detente in Europe. The 
agreement and the continued negotiations on confidence- and 
security-building measures (CSBM) has been one of the most 
concrete results. But it must be remembered that navy and landing 
excercises are not covered by the CSBM-provisions and that 
amphibious equipment and arctic special equipment and marine 
units are not covered by the CFE-treaty. In the present situation 
it seems unlikely that the agreements will be extended to include 
these marine aspects. The possible consequences of disarmament 
measures including marine units are also under debate." There 
have even been proposals for a demilitarization of the entire 
Baltic Sea.72 A proposal to that effect involves not only the principle 
of free shipping on international waters but also directly the 
small Baltic States, as Sweden, Russia, and the NATO members 
Germany and Denmark could reorganize their naval units outside 
the Baltic Sea, only to bring them back later, if necessary. Also, 
the uncertain situation in Eastern Europe does not invite the 
states involved to reduce their naval Forces to coast guard level. 
Thus a demilitarization decision would unilaterally restrict the 
defence measures.73  
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An extension of NATO does not seem likely in the 
immediate future. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
NACC, which was established as a forum for a dialogue with the 
former members of the Warsaw Pact, has started to work, but 
has not been able to fulfill the expectations of the Eastern European 
states, which wanted concrete protection from NATO. The answer 
to the membership applications, the offer of Partnership for Peace 
(PfP), should be seen as an attempt by NATO to avoid new walls 
in Europe and to advance a peaceful development in Eastern 
Europe. 
The future European security structure will have a great 
impact on the stategic position of the Baltic Sea and thus also of 
the Aland Islands. The most important question concerns Russia's 
standpoint in the future development. By and large it may be 
said that there are three alternatives: a continued disintegration 
in Russia, an increased risk of confrontation in the Baltic region 
and a peaceful division into interest spheres between the great 
powers, either formal or informal. 
Finland's and Sweden's accession to the European Union 
(EU) may also influence the strategic position in the area. The 
question of the common defence policy of the EU is still open 
and will not be discussed until 1996. If the principles in the 
Maastricht treaty about a possible common defence policy is 
carried out, it would change the strategic position of Northern 
Europe. Finland74 and Sweden have already become observers in 
the WEU. In the statutes of the Union it is stipulated that the 
member states are obliged to intervene to help a member state 
that has been attacked. The chances that e.g. Finland, even as a 
full member, would receive help if attacked should not be 
overrated, considering certain statements made by i.a. the 
Secretary General of the WEU.75 
It is an interesting question whether the integration in 
Europe, including defence co-operation, could bring the Aland 
conventions back into the limelight. If most of the signatory 
states Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, 
Italy, Latvia, Poland, and Sweden were members of e.g. the 
WEU, the convention from 1921 might again become topical in 
the sense that the WEU could become a common forum for the 
signatory states. 
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4 ALANDS STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE 
IN VARIOUS OPERATIONS 
0 
Aland's strategic position has at various times built on the 
potential threat of the islands being used against another party in 
a conflict. To find out which might be Aland's strategic 
significance in various operations today and in the future, it is 
necessary to take an unbiassed look at what is possible, 
considering the weapons technology and to connect this to various 
alternative operations, without taking a stand on the likelihood 
that these would arise. Thus, the operations presented here should 
not be seen as likely threat perceptions, but as a basis for a 
theoretical discussion about the role Aland might come to play 
in various operations. 
4.1 Military Geographical Position of the Åland Islands 
Infrastructure 
The Province of Åland consists of 6554 islands, large and 
small. Today 80 of these are populated.76 The so called mainland 
consists of the main island and the Eckerö, Lemland and 
Lumparland islands, connected to the main island by bridges. 
The total area is nearly 5000 km2, of which the islands take up 
just over 1500 km2. On 31 December 1992 the population was 
24 993, living in the city of Mariehamn and fifteen other 
municipalities. Mariehamn had a population just exceeding 
10 000. The smallest municipality was Sottunga, with 130 
inhabitants. The population density is 16.4 persons per square 
kilometer." 
Traditionally the most important industry in Aland has 
been shipping. Since the 1970's tourism has increased steadily, 
and today it is the largest branch of the economy. Farming is still 
important in Aland, as well as fishing and hunting. Of the nearly 
25 000 inhabitants almost 4 000 had a valid hunting license, i.e. 
nearly 15 % of the total population. Thus there is considerable 
knowledge of weapons in the islands, despite the exemption 
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from military service.78 The vehicle frequency is considerably 
higher than in the rest of Finland. The number of private cars per 
1 000 inhabitants was 510 in 1992, as compared to 380 in the rest 
of Finland. The number of vehicles that could be used for military 
purposes is also large, over 3 000 tractors and almost 300 lorries.79 
The public telecommunications network is extensive. A 
comparison between the provinces in Finland shows that in 1992 
the number of telephone extensions per 1 000 inhabitants was 
largest in Aland: 707 extensions as comeared to 540 in the whole 
country, or 688 in Sweden.8° In addition, Aland has been important 
for Finland's telephone connections abroad. As late as 1991 almost 
60 % of all connections from Finland abroad, and more than 90 % 
of the connections westwards, went via Aland. This ratio has 
changed rapidly with the construction of new alternative 
connections during the last few years. Thus Aland's significance 
for telecommunications has decreased recently." 
Aland is dependant on Sweden for its supply of electricity. 
With the exception of a combined power and heating plant using 
diesel oil and other substitutive energy, all electric power is 
imported by sea cable from Sweden. In 1990 the imports amounted 
to 75.8 % of all purchased electric power.S2 The low self-sufficiency 
rate impairs Aland's preparedness in a crisis. 
Factors Concerning Land and Air Forces 
The Åland mainland is at most 50 km long and 40 km wide 
(Map 2). In relation to the area, the road network is well 
developed, there are 906 km of public roads, of which 550 km 
permanented.S3 The roads are thus well suited for troop 
movements on land, and also for vehicle-based weapons systems. 
Although the road network is dense, the roads concentrate on 
Mariehamn and Jomala, and in Hammarland, Gölby and Godby. 
The Eckerö, Lemland and Lumparland islands are connected to 
the Aland mainland by bridges. By controlling these areas one 
could effectively prevent traffic between the various parts of the 
Aland mainland. 
For landing heavy equipment ferry berths are required. 
There are ferry berths not only in Mariehamn but also in Eckerö, 
on Prästö in Sund, and in Långnäs on Lumparland. Transports 
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from the three ports outside Mariehamn require control of the 
Marsund, Färjsund and Lemström Channel bridges. 
Typical landing areas are to be found only in Möckelö, 4 
km west of Mariehamn and at Degersand, on the south point of 
Eckerö. Elsewhere the shores are stony, with dense forest growing 
almost down to the water. The shallow waters with plenty of 
reefs require special equipment, e.g. hovercraft, for landing. In 
southwestern Aland, e.g. at Hammarudda, the waters are deep 
right into the shore, but the rocky shores require beach terminals 
for landing equipment. 
Operative airborne landings can be made directly at 
Mariehamn airport or on the large fields extending in a half 
circle from Gottby to Jomala church village, northwest and 
northeast of the airport. The runways at Mariehamn airport are 
of sufficient length also for larger carrier planes.1' 
Thus a combined landing and airborne operation directly 
against Mariehamn is possible by means of landing at Möckelö 
and landing north or north west of the city. By controlling the 
main traffic junctions an attacker could also effectively isolate 
the central areas of the mainland, using relatively small units. By 
landing on Eckerö an attacker could secure the operation against 
an counterattack from the west and at the same time have control 
over the shipping through the southern Kvarken straits." 
Especially in a rapidly arising crisis, where an effective defence 
has not yet been set up, the risk of a direct attack might increase. 
Aland's geographical position offers a suitable area for air-
warning service. The heights on northern Aland, surrounded by 
sea and fairly low-lying areas, offer a suitable area for radar 
picketing. It has been calculated that mobile radar stations from 
the area could reach a range of 110 km to 350 km, depending on 
the altitude of the target. A mobile radar system could be 
transferred to the islands at relatively short notice.," A radar 
station on Aland could thus complement the Finnish air-warning 
service and extend its range. For the superpowers' air- warning 
service the islands probably are of no significance, since the air-
based radar systems have an even wider range. 
Considering the range of the aircraft, an air base on Aland 
would hardly give any advantages that could not be obtained by 
bases in Finland, Sweden or the Baltic States. Also in this respect 
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the Russian withdrawal changes the situation. An air base on 
Aland would, however, be extremely vulnerable and require a 
strong air defence and fortified positions. An air defence could 
be set up in a relatively short time, but fortifying the area would 
take times' In case of a strategic surprise attack" against Sweden 
or Finland the advantages of such a risk might however be 
greater than the disadvantages. 
Factors Concerning Naval Forces 
Of the Finnish foreign trade 85 % was transported by sea in 
1993.59 In a state of emergency the sea communications must be 
maintained, by using sheltered routes. One of these routes could 
go via Aland or across the Kvarken straits in shelter of the 
islands. The control of the Aland Islands is thus of vital importance 
when safeguarding the continuity of the foreign trade. 
The Aland archipelago, with its numerous small islands, 
provides relatively good air and radar shelter for smaller vessels. 
Thus the area would be suitable as a base area for naval units. 
The waters are shallow and difficult to navigate without good 
knowledge of the area. Mining could be used to limit the traffic 
further. The Aland waters are well suited for mining, with the 
exception of the ,places where the depth exceeds 200 meters, 
southwest of the Aland mainland. The shallow waters also make 
submarine activities difficult although the experiences from 
Sweden prove that such activities are not out of the question. 
Marine tactics have changed, putting more emphasis on 
mobile amphibious units that complement or replace the 
stationary coast artillery. In Sweden there are already a number 
of amphibious battalions in operative use. The battalions are 
equipped to move on their own, and armed with i.a. coastal 
robots, for combat in the archipelago.9° Finland has a coast brigade, 
equipped so as to be able to operate i.a. in the archipelago in 
southwestern Finland. Also the Soviet, nowadays Russian, 
marine infantry brigade based in Kaliningrad92 is probably suited 
for combat in the archipelago. The increased emphasis on mobile 
amphibious units instead of stationary units decreases the need 
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for stationary fortifications. Thus the demilitarization of Aland 
becomes less important in the future, as the need for stationary 
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structures decreases. But the need of intelligence, reconnaissance 
and excercises in the area increases if combat in the archipelago 
is to be effective. 
The ice situation in the Alandic waters varies, depending 
on the severity of the winter. During mild winters and in early 
spring the Aland Sea is free from ice, but the sea between Aland 
and the Finnish mainland is frozen.93 Under such conditions the 
Finnish navy is dependent on icebreakers to be able to manouver 
freely and to protect Aland, as the conventions only permit limited 
military presence in peacetime. 
The fairway to the Gulf of Bothnia goes via Swedish 
territorial waters, west of Märket in the southern part of the 
Kvarken straits. To close the sound and cut off the Gulf of Bothnia 
entirely mines must be laid down in Finnish as well as in Swedish 
waters. By simultaneous mining.  of the southern part of the 
Kvarken straits and control of the Aland mainland and the Aland 
archipelago, Aland could still be used to barricade the Gulf of 
Bothnia. 
Aland is centrally positioned in the northern Baltic Sea. 
The distances to the coasts are short: westwards across the 
southern part of the Kvarken straits to the Swedish coast 40 km, 
southwards to Hiiumaa 150 km and to the Estonian coast less 
than 200 km. As the ranges of the weapons systems and the 
speed of the ships increase, a naval unit in the Alandic waters 
could constitute a threat against shipping in the northern Baltic 
Sea. Contrarily, a naval detachment could constitute a surprise 
threat against the islands, without even violating the Aland zone. 
To prevent the area from becoming the goal for a "sailing race" it 
would be in the interest of all parties to avoid a situation where 
the islands constitute a potential threat. Thus the basic intention 
of the Geneva convention from 1921 has not changed. The 
question remains whether a convention can be sufficient to 
prevent the area from being drawn into a crisis. 
Aland's position and the character of the islands give the 
defender one great advantage. An attack against the islands 
would be both costly and difficult.94 The price goes up, the better 
organized the defence is. In addition, Finland does not have the 
resources to take Aland back if the islands fall into enemy hands 
in a surprise attack.' For a potential attacker it would thus be 
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most advantageous to attack at an early stage of a crisis, before 
Finland has had the time to set up an effective defence. This puts 
high demands on Finland's ability to react quickly on a threat 
against the area's integrity, when necessary. These high demands 
might, if it comes to the worst, lead to overreactions in a critical 
situation, and this could in turn aggravate the situation. 
Åland 4.2 Aland as an Operational Area in view of the Development 
of Military Technology 
Since the Second World War a considerable change has 
taken place in the naval strategic thinking in the Baltic Sea. 
Before the Second World War, navies were equipped in 
accordance with the ideas of the naval strategist Alfred Mahan 
(1840-1914) that naval superiority was acheived by means of 
great navies. Thus e.g. Finland built two armoured ships, the 
Väinämöinen and the Ilmarinen, in the 1930's, i.a. to be able to 
protect Aland. Along with the development of the weapons 
technology, naval tactics both in Finland and in Sweden has 
evolved into a defence strategy where small but fast naval units 
can be used to employ modern weapons with a long range and 
good precision and effect against a superior power. The areas 
most suited for such tactics are located in the almost unbroken 
archipelago extending from the eastern coast of Sweden on level 
with Oland across the Aland Islands and along the northern 
coast of the Gulf of Finland. The Aland archipelago is very 
suitable as a support area and would provide very good protection 
against discovery. A naval unit spread out over the area could 
constitute a flank threat against a fleet in the northern Baltic Sea, 
which does not provide similar cover. 
The significance of the archipelago as a protective factor 
has been estimated to increase concurrently with the development 
of the arms technology. In order to protect of the ships more 
efficiently, so called stealth technology is used to impede 
discovery. In Sweden the development has already reached the 
prototype stage." Another result of the development of precision 
weapons is that both Sweden and Finland are reorganizing their 
coastal artillery from stationary fortified units into units with a 
mobile structure. 97 
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The development of anti-ship missiles attracted attention 
in the Falkland war in 1982, when a single hit by an Exocet 
missile demolished the British destroyer HMS Sheffield. The 
characteristics of the missiles vary considerably, depending on 
the areas where they are to be used. RBS 15, used operatively 
both in Sweden and in Finland, has a range exceeding 70 km, but 
can only be used in open sea. This missile exists in an aircraft-, 
ship- and vehicle-based version, completing the stationary coastal 
artillery. The Russian vehicle-based missile SS-C-3 has a range of 
90 km.98 The next generation of missiles are estimated to have a 
range of 200 km and to obtain a speed of 2-3 mach. As a result of 
this development, the demilitarization of the Aland Islands no 
longer constitutes an obstacle, should the need arise to quickly 
prevent all traffic through the southern part of the Kvarken 
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straits or the Aland archipelago to the Gulf of Bothnia. As both 
Finland and Sweden have RBS 15 missiles, these countries could 
prevent any advancement through the Aland constriction, which 
is no wider than 160 km from Grisslehamn in Sweden to Kustavi 
in Finland. Another result is that the entire demilitarized area 
can be covered by the range of the missiles, without necessitating 
firing within the area. This increases the possibilities to maintain 
a credible defence, despite the limitations set up in the 
conventions. Basing RBS 15 missiles on Aland would make it 
possible to close the entire Aland constriction. 
The Aland archipelago has always been considered difficult 
to navigate. The stony shores and the limited harbour area require 
special equipment for landing. But the development of special 
surface effect ships (SES) has advanced rapidly, and in future the 
conditions on Aland cannot be considered an obstacle to minor 
landing operations even on difficult shores. Using SES technology 
the vessels obtain a speed of 60 - 90 knots. The largest vessels can 
load up to 100 tons)°° With the development of transport aircraft 
with tilt-rotor engines it has been possible to combine the flying 
properties of the airplane with the lifting and landing properties 
of the helicopter.10' The development of fast amphibious units 
reduces the prewarning time for a coastal defender. The Soviet 
Union calculated that NATO's 0TH (over the horizon) tactics 
reduced the prewarning time from weeks/days to hours.102 In 
the case of Aland the problem is accentuated, as the conventions 
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prohibit defence preparations in peacetime. Thus the islands are 
very vulnerable to surprise attacks at an early stage of a military 
crisis.103 
Navigation in difficult waters has since long been made easier 
by radio based navigation systems. The development of the satellite 
navigation systems increase the range and accuracy of the systems. 
The satellite navigation system GPS (Global Positioning System) 
gives a navigation accuracy of just over ten meters, and DGPS 
(Differential GPS) an accuracy of 1-3 meters.104 A military application 
of laser beacons could also make the marking of fairways easier and 
faster.'°' Thus the possibility that an attacker might use the Alandic 
waters cannot be entirely excluded. 
The submarine hunts carried out in Sweden during the 1980's 
and 1990's, gave reason to believe that midget submarines had been 
operating in the Swedish archipelago. Although the hunts in Sweden 
have not yielded any results, the modern midget submarines are 
technically suitable for operations also in the shallow Alandic waters. 
The submarines probably are resistant to depth charges and mines 
and have a long operating period. To obtain greater mobility, the 
submarines carry diving vessels.106 The underwater monitoring 
systems have been greatly developed in the 1990's. This has resulted 
in low-noise propulsion systems for submarines and in methods of 
interference and deception devices. The development is expected to 
lead to a competition between measures and countermeasures. 
The maximum depth at which bottom mines can be used 
against surface vessels is around 60 m. But the latest development 
goes in the direction of target-finding mines, that may be activated 
by a target even at a depht of 200 m. Such a development makes it 
possible to use mines even in the Alandic waters, with the exception 
of the deepest area of the southern part of the Kvarken straits, 
where the water is 290 m deep.107 The mines can also to an increasing 
extent be laid by submarines under water. Furthermore, there are 
now mine torpedoes, able to find their own way to the target area. 
Thus.underwater operations using versatile weapons systems are 
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technically possible also in the Alandic waters, even if the archipelago 
limits the use of remote-controlled and submarine-laid mines.1 ,' 
These factors should be considered when assessing likely enemy 
operations against the islands. 
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4.3. Alternative Operations 
Air Defence of Russia 
The limitations introduced through the INF treaty and the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), are expected to result 
in a restructuring of the nuclear arsenals. During the START 
negotiations less attention was paid to the capacity of the sea and 
air based nuclear weapons than to that of the ground based 
missiles. Thus the air and sea based cruise missiles will constitute 
the most effective strategic weapon against the northern regions 
of the CIS and Russia.109  
One reason why NATO and primarily the United States 
have concentrated on bombers was the mobile nuclear weapons 
system of the former Soviet Union, which could not be knocked 
out by pre-programmed ballistic missiles. Finding the missiles 
required bombers able to penetrate the Soviet air defence. Parallell 
to this, cruise missiles were developed, forcing the Soviet Union 
to make very costly investments in new air defence systems. One 
of the purposes of the cruise missiles was to put further strain on 
the already stretched Soviet economy. By saturating the Soviet 
air defence it would be easier for the bombers to penetrate into 
Soviet air territory.70 
The Norwegian Sea was considered to be one of the United 
States' most important firing areas for cruise missiles. The shortest 
air routes to targets on the Kola Peninsula and in northwestern 
Russia go through Swedish and Finnish air space. To counter the 
threat from the cruise missiles, the Soviet Union deployed its air 
defence in the Baltic States, on the Kola and around Moscow. 
This increased the tension in the Baltic Sea, as this area was best 
suited for signal reconnaissance. The withdrawal from the Baltic 
States forced the Russian air defence into an entirely new situation. 
In the winter of 1994 Russia made an agreement with Latvia 
allowing it to keep for four years the radar reconnaissance station 
in Skrunda, which was part of the strategic early-warning system 
against ballistic missiles. Even when Russia has had time to 
build a new warning system, the demands on Finland's, including 
Aland's, air defence are likely to be maintained. A lacking 
confidence in Finland's air defence would increase the 
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speculations and could draw the country into the strategies of 
the great powers. To reduce tension in the area it might thus be 
necessary to intensify air reconnaissance in Aland in the beginning 
of a crisis. In this respect the modernization of the Finnish air 
force will improve the situation, as F/A-18 Hornet as the first 
Finnish fighter will have a "look down - shoot down" capacity, 
which is necessary for shooting down cruise missiles over land. 
The Russian nuclear weapons programme is today 
considered to concentrate to strategic submarines in the Northern 
Fleet. The naval bases in Kola will thus be given top priority in 
the Russian air defence. The range of the American Tomahawk 
cruise missile with a conventional warhead is 1300 km, when 
fired from a submarine. The missile can also be provided with a 
nuclear warhead, extending the range to 2500 km. The Soviet 
cruise missile SS-N-21 has a range of 3000 km, but is less accurate, 
as it is planned for use with a nuclear warhead. A Russian 
counterpart to the Tomahawk was supposed to be under 
development already in 1991. Considering the most important 
targets in the area, the Gulf of Bothnia is the optimal firing area 
in Northern Europe. From here the cruise missiles' range is 
sufficient to reach all strategically important areas in Northern 
Europe: the Kola Peninsula and St. Petersburg in the east and 
Norway's Atlantic coast and the Danish straits in the west."' 
Air Defence of Finland 
In a critical international situation the demands on Finland's 
ability to maintain her territorial integrity will increase. A credible 
surveillance and interception system will reduce the risks of the 
country becoming involved in a conflict. Aland is well situated 
for air-warning service. In a critical international situation Finland 
could thus increase the range and coverage of its air-warning 
service by deploying mobile air units on the islands, allowing the 
air defence longer warning times. In case of an attack against 
Finland it would be necessary to deploy anti-aircraft artillery on 
the islands to prevent enemy air operations. On the other hand, 
Finland would hardly gain much by deploying airborne units on 
the islands, as their warning times would be short and the bases 
would be subject to enemy attacks. 
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Åland There are good possibilities to use A  as a helicopter 
base in case of a coastal invasion against Finland. If an attacker 
can protect its bases and is far from alternative bases, Mariehamn 
could also be used as an air base. From Aland an attacker could 
support an operation against southwestern Finland. Particularly 
the defence of south-western Finland would be vulnerable. An 
enemy base in the area would also threaten to cut the sea and air 
connections between Finland and Sweden. 
The strong Swedish air defence could to some extent be of 
use to Finland's air defence over Aland. The short distance from 
Stockholm - just over 100 km - means that Aland could lie in the 
"lee" of the Stockholm anti-aircraft system, from attacks directed 
over Swedish air space. Bases of attack and destroyer units on 
Aland would constitute a real threat also against Sweden. This in 
turn could result in Swedish military measures against an enemy 
base on the islands. 
Air Defence of Sweden 
For the Swedish air defence it is essential that Finland is 
capable of controlling its air space. This particularly goes for the 
air space over Aland. For the Swedish defence the Baltic Sea is 
the "English Channel" that enables the country to meet a coastal 
invasion on international waters or, at the latest, at the borders. If 
Finland could not defend its air space over Aland, it would 
reduce the depth of the Swedish air defence system from 200 km 
across the Baltic Sea to 40 km across the Aland Sea. 
There are good possibilities to use Aland as a helicopter or 
air base in case of a coastal invasion against Sweden. From Aland 
an attacker could easily support an operation against Mälardalen 
and Roslagen with both attack and transport helicopters. By 
using Aland as a "transit port" to move troops to Swedish territory 
by helicopter, an attacker could increase the chances of its 
invasion. Basing attack and destroyer units on Aland would 
shorten flight times considerably and increase the pressure on 
the Swedish air defence, but require considerably greater anti-
aircraft resources than a helicopter base. 
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Naval Defence of Russia 
One of Russia's most important naval interests in the Baltic 
Sea is the possibility to prevent a potential attacker from 
threatening Russian territory or vital interests in the area, i.a. St. 
Petersburg and the Kola Peninsula, but possibly also operations 
in "near abroad" countries. A shifting of the focus in the Baltic 
Sea northwards and eastwards means that the Russian forward 
edge of battle area (FEBA) is brought closer to Finland. This 
means that also in the future Finland is expected to maintain a 
sufficient defence, to avoid a vacuum in the vicinity of Russia's 
vital areas. One question is how Aland's demilitarized status 
affects the Russian security system. Could the area constitute a 
gap in a forward defence system, if Finland is unable to protect 
the integrity of her territory? Against that background it is unlikely 
that a totally demilitarized Aland is compatible with Russian 
security interests, unless they themselves intend to take advantage 
of the demilitarization, if necessary. As the significance of the 
Gulf of Finland for the Russian defence may increase, it is not 
impossible that a future Russian regime, just as was the case in 
1939, could demand bases in the Baltic Sea area to protect St. 
Petersburg, alternatively to guarantee the Baltic Fleet its own 
freedom of action. To avoid such a scenario it is important that 
Finland does not make its territory available for an attack against 
Russia. This goes for Aland, too. By maintaining a credible defence 
Finland reduces the risks of being drawn into a conflict. 
It is probably vital for Russia to be able to demonstrate to 
the world at large that it can protect its communications with 
Kaliningrad. As Russia's defence zone in the Baltic Sea is now 
limited only to St. Petersburg and the Kaliningrad oblast, it may 
become of top priority for Russia to be able to secure its sea line 
of communication (SLOC) between the bases. A potential area 
for threatening the communications is the nearly unbroken 
archipelago extending from the Swedish east coast on the level 
of Oland over Aland to the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland. 
From these areas it would be possible to threaten the sea traffic in 
the northern Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland. This may reduce 
the Russian interest in changing Aland's demilitarized status. 
The Russian withdrawal does not automatically diminish 
the Baltic Fleet's need for bases in the Baltic Sea. As a result of the 
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dispute with Ukraine about the Black Sea Fleet it is possible that 
Russia will transfer part of the fleet to the Baltic Sea, which 
would further increase the need for bases.72 Despite its 
strategically vulnerable position, Kaliningrad is likely to remain 
an important naval base, even if the focus is shifted to St. 
Petersburg. In addition, Kaliningrad is indirectly important for 
Finland and Aland, as a withdrawal from there would further 
underline the significance of the Gulf of Finland.13 
It was generally feared that the Russian withdrawal from 
the Baltic States would be delayed or not come off due to 
disagreement about i.a. the treatment of the Russian minorities. 
After the withdrawal several disagreements remain, which may, 
in the long term, cause new crises. Thus it is likely that Russia 
will maintain its options to put pressure on the Baltic States, if 
necessary. 
To further compensate the loss of anti-aircraft defence and 
naval reconnaissance suffered at the withdrawal from the Baltic 
States, it is likely that Russia will in the future have advanced 
naval based systems in the Baltic Sea. The head of the Soviet 
Military Information Agency, GRU, colonel general Vladlen M. 
Michailov, in May 1990 considered that intelligence will become 
more important in case of a withdrawal, to enable anticipation of 
surprise attacks."} The latest development can only have increased 
the need for information in the Northern Baltic Sea. As the Baltic 
States decided to adopt the territorial line of 12 nautical miles 
established by the Soviet Union, the naval activities in the northern 
Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland are likely to move closer to the 
Finnish border, as the Russian navy is now obliged to use a 
fairway futher north. The Finnish decision to extend its territorial 
waters to 12 nautical miles, too, is likely to check the increasing 
traffic in the close vicinity and to direct the traffic in the Gulf of 
Finland to a narrow channel of international waters. The extension 
at the same time means that the international waters around 
Aland will be cut down, and Finland's undemilitarized territorial 
waters around Aland will grow.15 
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Invasion against Finland 
In case of an invasion against Finland, Åland could come to 
play an important part, both in a border invasion and in a coastal 
invasion. Today the Gulf of Bothnia is a military inner sea to 
Sweden and Finland. As long as that situation remains unchanged, 
Finland can maintain a lower military preparedness in the area 
and concentrate its resources to the strategic core areas. Thus 
Aland is of great strategic importance to Finland, regardless of 
the direction of operations. 
Should there be a coastal invasion against the Finnish coast 
along the Gulf of Bothnia, Aland would naturally play a decisive 
role, as total control of the area is an absolute requirement for the 
success of the operation. An invasion would therefore be preceded 
by an occupation of Aland, most likely at an early stage of a 
crisis, to forestall a concentration of Finnish troops to the islands. 
The goal of a coastal invasion could either be to isolate Finland in 
connection with a border invasion, or to occupy territory for 
aircraft or helicopter bases in support of operations west, east or 
north of the Gulf of Bothnia. 
In case of a coastal invasion against southern Finland, Aland 
could be very important both to the Finnish defenders and to the 
attacker. The sheltered Aland archipelago together with the 
archipelago in the south-west of Finland provide a good base 
area for the Finnish naval forces. An attacker would thus be 
obliged to set aside protective forces to secure the area, which 
would require considerable resources. 
Aland could also be of importance in case of a conflict in 
the Arctic area of the Scandinavian countries and the Kola 
peninsula. In case of an attack against northern Finland, the 
attacker would gain considerable advantages by attacking Aland, 
too. Finland could effectively be isolated from the west, and also 
be obliged to redeploy its ground forces to the Gulf of Bothnia. In 
combination with a ground offensive in Lapland, the defence of 
southern Finland could be ringed in and the country divided in 
two. 
Independent of the manner or direction of the invasion, 
Aland's significance for Finland would be crucial, as an attack 
against Aland would also entail a risk of Finland's most important 
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trade routes being cut off. Even a threat against the islands 
would force Finland to set aside resources to be able to maintain 
its freedom of action. 
Invasion against Sweden 
0 
As a result of the latest defence decision, Aland's strategic 
significance for Sweden may increase when the number of 
brigades has been reduced from 29 to 16 over a short period of 
time. After the reductions Sweden no longer counts on being 
able to meet attacks from several directions at the same time, but 
intends to concentrate all forces in one direction, either against a 
coastal invasion or against a border invasion.16 Thus great 
advantages are offered by control of Aland in an operation against 
Sweden. It would be difficult for Sweden to concentrate its forces 
in one direction when an attacker could direct an operative threat 
against Norrland via the Gulf of Bothnia. There are also good 
possibilities to support a continued ground offensive from Aland. 
In Sweden it has earlier been estimated that the Soviet Union has 
had operative plans against the Swedish east coast as an attack 
route to southern or northern Norway. '7 Another goal of such 
an operation could be to support either a coastal invasion against 
eastern Central Sweden or a border invasion from the north. 
The most likely direction of a coastal invasion is still eastern 
Central Sweden, with landings between Gävle and Norrköping. 
Here, too, Aland can be of great significance for Sweden and the 
well-worn image of Aland as a "gun aimed at Stockholm" could 
again be brought up to date. A helicopter base in the area could 
give an attacker superiority in an operation north of Lake Mälaren 
and also give an attacker a possibility to transfer reinforcements 
by helicopter instead of bringing them in on ships all the way to 
Swedish territory. An air base in the area would also provide 
range far into Swedish territory. 
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Aland's significance in a coastal invasion against the 
Swedish coast of the Gulf of Bothnia is evidently also great. But it 
must be noted that an attack on Sweden also would result in an 
attack on Finland, as an operation would require control of Aland. 
Furthermore Swedish counter-offensives would be likely to 
involve Aland, as a continued power increase could most easily 
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be prevented in the Åland constriction. Thus an attack on Sweden 
would draw Finland into the conflict. Already the threat 
constituted by an occupation of Aland by a third power would 
be intolerable from a Swedish military point of view. Thus it is 
possible that Sweden would consider an occupation of Aland a 
hostile act against itself. 
Consequently Aland is of great sea and ground strategic 
significance for both Finland and Sweden, as the islands isolate 
the Gulf of Bothnia from the rest of the Baltic Sea. As long as the 
Gulf of Bothnia remains an inner sea, the countries can keep a 
lower level of naval, coastal and ground defence in the area. 
From an air strategic point of view the islands could again become 
the "gun aimed at Stockholm" and constitute a threat against 
Swedish operations in eastern Central Sweden. 
Operations in the Baltic States 
Russia will probably seek to maintain a strong position in 
the Baltic Sea, regardless of the form of government. The relations 
between the Baltic States and Russia is a factor of uncertainty 
which will influence the strategic position of the entire Baltic Sea 
for a long time. A Russian invasion of the Baltic States would 
restore the militarily situation prevailing in the Soviet era, at the 
cost of a considerable security policy loss in the relations to the 
West. Should a Russian invasion nevertheless take place, it would 
increase military tension in the entire Baltic Sea and consequently 
also on Aland. An alternative low conflict scenario is that the 
antagonism between the Baltic States and Russia will result in 
Russian trade sanctions and attempts to isolate Baltic ports, for 
instance under the pretext of preventing illicit trafficking. Another 
possibility is that Russia will demand bases in the Baltic States as 
it did in 1939. 
The risks of Aland becoming involved in a conflict depends 
on the measures taken by the rest of the world. In case of an 
intervention Aland could gain importance for all the parties 
involved, in order to secure air and sea control over the northern 
Baltic Sea and the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. In that situation 
it is likely that Russia would as long as possible invoke the 
demilitarization of Aland to reduce the threat or to conceal any 
offensive operations of its own against the islands. As in the 
Barbarossa offensive in 1941, the party controlling both the Baltic 
coast and Aland could have control over the operations. 
In Russian estimates it has been presumed that NATO 
would try to increase its influence in the Baltic States by 
establishing naval and air bases in the area as a first stage."s In 
this case Russia would certainly increase its naval presence to 
defend its interests. This would markedly raise tension in the 
northern Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland and also affect 
Finland's naval defence. 
Peace-keeping Operations in the Baltic Sea 
If the development in the former Soviet states gets out of 
hand entirely and results in either civil war or hostilities between 
the states, the results for the whole of Europe may be unexpected. 
Thus it is likely that various organisations would try to restrain 
the conflicts at an early stage - provided that an agreement with 
the parties involved is possible. It is likely that these measures 
would not be restricted to one single organisation, but that all 
conceivable organisations, UN, EU, WEU, OSCE and NATO 
would jointly attempt to solve the conflict. 
Possible objectives of these operations could be to terminate 
a civil war, to prevent the hostilities from spreading, to prevent 
organized crime - both at sea and on land - and to give 
humanitarian aid. The methods for such operations could follow 
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali s 'Agenda for Peace', and range 
from preventive diplomacy to peace-enforcing measures. 
If the Russian Baltic Fleet is split up between various parties 
in a civil war, an international operation could be required to 
secure free shipping in the Baltic Sea. Such an operation could 
extend from a monitoring operation, involving only monitoring 
of movements, to armed operations of a peace-keeping or peace-
enforcing nature. As the operations require speedy measures by 
forces and sea rescue personnel, the Gotland, Aland and Oland 
islands could become important bases for such operations due to 
their central position. Also in case of a trade embargo on certain 
parts of the Baltic Sea - similar to the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia - the larger islands in the Baltic Sea could become 
important points of support for the forces employed in enforcing 
the embargo. 
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5 THE CONVENTIONS CONCERNING 
THE ÅLAND ISLANDS AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON THE STRATEGIC 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISLANDS 
As has already been mentioned, the Finnish authorities' 
decisions on measures to be taken will have an effect on the 
strategic position of the Aland Islands in an evolving crisis. The 
measures to defend the area's integrity are bound to the 
conventions concerning the Aland Islands. As Finland has always 
endeavoured to honour any conventions entered into, these 
conventions indicate her probable course of action. 
The conventions influencing Aland's strategic position and 
considered to be in force are the following: the 1921 Convention 
relating to the Non-fortification and Neutralization of the Aland 
Islands, signed by Finland and Germany, Denmark, Estonia, 
France, Great Britain, Italy, Latvia, Poland and Sweden, the Treaty 
of 1940 between Finland and the Soviet Union concerning the 
Aland Islands, and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty.119 The treaty on 
Finland's accession to the EU also guarantees status quo for 
Aland in international law. Also the UN convention on the 
territorial sea and the contiguous zone of 1958 and the UN 
convention on the Law of the Sea from 1982 (UNCLOS III) 
influence the stipulations about shipping through the Alandic 
waters. 
The purpose of the conventions has to a lesser extent been 
to protect the province of Aland. The main purpose has been to 
ascertain that Aland, in the hands of a potential enemy, could not 
threaten any other power in the Baltic Sea area. Thus the 
conventions have on the one hand limited the mother country's 
sovereignty over the area, and on the other hand obliged it to 
defend the islands when necessary. The conventions are thus 
fairly detailed, and on some points they even seem contradictory. 
The limitations and the defence obligations still characterize the 
area's strategic position. 
5.1 The 1921 Convention relating to the Non- fortification and 
Neutralization of the Aland Islands 
The convention was concluded with the purpose of 
continuing the demilitarization decision from 1856. In article 1 
Finland confirms that it will comply with this convention, too. 
The convention defines clear boundaries for both the land 
and sea area (article 2). The demilitarized sea area extends three 
nautical miles outside the islands, islets and reefs included in the 
zone. The limit of three nautical miles was established in 
accordance with the prevailing situation in 1921. As Finland 
later, in accordance with international practice, has extended its 
territorial sea to four nautical miles (with the exception of the 
waters around Bogskär), and now has decided to extend it further 
to twelve nautical miles120, there will be a strip of Finnish territorial 
sea, nine nautical miles wide, that is not affected by the 
stipulations on non-fortification and neutralization. Thus Finland 
could start laying protective mining in this strip even before 
taking such exceptional measures as the convention allows.121 
The Aland demilitarized zone is divided into two separate areas, 
on the one hand the Aland archipelago proper, on the other hand 
Bogskär. Between these areas there is international waters, which 
will be included in Finland's territorial sea when it is extended. 
This territorial sea will not be affected by the demilitarization. 
Although only the land and sea areas are mentioned in the 
extension of the zone, also the air space is considered to be 
demilitarized and neutralized.122 Finland is still entitled to let its 
air force fly over the area, but in peacetime these can land only in 
an emergency (article 4(c)).'21  
Article 3 in the convention prohibits the setting up of any 
establishment of a military character. Article 4 further prohibits 
any "military, naval or air force" from entering124 or remaining 
in the zone. According to the Finnish interpretation, the frontier 
guard , is not a military force, and its establishments are not 
military. As none of the signatory states has opposed this 
interpretation, they evidently embrace it.125 The article also 
prohibits import, transport and re-export of arms and implements 
of war. The frontier guard's light armament has not been 
considered to be in conflict with these provisions, as long as it 
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equals the armament used by the frontier guard for similar tasks 
in the rest of Finland.126 
Article 4 also mentions peacetime exceptions to the 
limitations: Finland can, if "exceptional circumstances demand" 
send into the zone and keep there temporarily such armed forces 
that are "strictly necessary for the maintenance of order" (article 
4(a)). Finland also reserves the right for one or two of its light 
warships127 to visit the islands and anchor there.128 In addition, 
Finland can "if important special circumstances demand" also 
send in other ships. Their total displacement must not exceed 
6000 tons. Considering the Finnish naval force, this tonnage limit 
is of no consequence today, when the ships are relatively small. 
The wording of the convention "exceptional circumstances" or 
"important special circumstances" is rather vague. "Exceptional 
circumstances" can still be considered to be more serious than 
"important special circumstances". The "circumstances" must 
primarily be seen as threats against the islands' neutrality or 
possible internal unrest.129 
According to the peacetime exceptions mentioned in article 
4, the Finnish government is entitled to allow "one warship of 
any other power" to enter the Aland Islands.1 ' 
The convention of 1856 having only been concerned with 
the demilitarization of the area, the convention of 1921 goes 
further. Article 6 neutralizes the Aland Islands in times of war. 
The article still entitles Finland to lay mines and take "strictly 
necessary" measures of a maritime nature to safeguard the neutral 
zone, in the event of a war affecting the Baltic Sea (article 6.2). 
Thus Finland after consultation with Sweden mined the waters 
in the Aland Sea around Märket as early as September 1939, to 
protect Finland's sea communications westwards across the Aland 
Sea, the southern parts of the Kvarken straits and the Gulf of 
Bothnia 131 
The entire article 4, prohibiting the use of military forces in 
Aland, is subject to the conditions mentioned in article 7. This 
contains provision about measures to defend the neutral zone. 
The first paragraph is concerned with guarantees and the 
measures the League of Nations and the signatory states might 
take in case of a threat against the neutrality of the islands. Since 
the dissolution of the League of Nations, the convention no 
longer has any guarantor.132 Thus the signatory states can no 
longer be obliged to participate in the defence of Aland's 
neutrality. But according to the interpretation made by Björkholm-
Rosas Finland could refer to the article to apply for military 
support from the signatory states. As long as the assistance is 
under Finnish control, it would not be in violation of the 
prohibition in the treaty from 1940 to put the islands at the 
disposal of the armed forces of alien states.733  
The fact that the League of Nations no longer can guarantee 
the observance of the convention, and that the other signatory 
states cannot be considered to be obliged to defend it, stresses 
the significance of article 7.II, containing provisions about Finnish 
defence measures. The article can thus still be seen as an 
immediate obligation to defend the islands.1  
When taking "necessary measures" according to article 7, 
Finland is not bound by article 4, restricting the military forces, 
the presence of warships or the landing of military aircraft on the 
islands. The restriction in article 6 about "strictly necessary" 
maritime measures is no longer applicable, either. The opinions 
about the validity of article 3 in this situation are divided.135 
From a purely military and practical point of view, a situation 
where a troop must defend an area without establishing any 
military or naval construction is intolerable. Thus a strictly 
legitimistic view must be regarded as only theoretical. 
But article 7.II. cannot be applied until the islands have 
been attacked. The mere existence of a threat of attack against 
Aland only entitles Finland to take the exceptional measures 
mentioned in articles 4 and 6 (warships, troops for maintaining 
internal order and protective mining). The attack need not be 
aimed directly against the Aland mainland, a violation of Alandic 
waters is sufficient.136 
Article 8 stipulates that the convention shall remain in 
force "in spite of any changes that may take place in the present 
status quo in the Baltic Sea". Although the League of Nations no 
longer exists, Finland has claimed that the convention is in force. 
Finland has also informed the other signatory states in matters 
that have been considered to concern the convention.'' One of 
the weakest points in the convention was that the Soviet Union 
was not a party to it. But according to the 1947 Peace Treaty, the 
Soviet Union could in some respects be considered to be a party 
to the convention. Also the application of the convention supports 
this, as the Soviet Union in practice accepted the military activity 
permitted by the convention, even though the treaty of 1940 does 
not permit it. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Finland 
and Russia have agreed that Russia takes the Soviet Union's 
place as a party to the convention. 
5.2 The Treaty of 1940 between Finland and the Soviet Union 
concerning the Aland Islands 
The Soviet Union having been dissolved, Finland and Russia 
have agreed that Russia has taken over the part of the Soviet 
Union. Thus the treaty is still in force. The treaty follows the 
provisions from 1921 fairly closely, though there are some clear 
differences. The treaty of 1940 only mentions non-fortification, 
not neutralization of the islands. The treaty does not mention the 
exceptional measures from the convention of 1921, although these 
are considered to be in force.1 ' Still, Finland undertakes not to 
put the islands at the disposal of the armed forces of alien states. 
This prohibition probably does not categorically prevent 
assistance according to the convention of 1921. The prohibition 
can also be interpreted as yet another obligation to protect the 
islands against an attack.139 
The extent of the demilitarized zone is the same as in the 
convention of 1921. The treaty of 1940 gives the Soviet Union 
(Russia) the right to maintain a consulate in Aland, to monitor 
that the demilitarization is carried out. Should the consul observe 
anything that he considers to be in conflict with the treaty, a joint 
investigation shall be made. 
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5.3 Conventions on Passage through Alandic Waters 
According to article 5 in the convention of 1921, the 
prohibition for warships to enter or stay in the zone does not 
affect their right of innocent passage, according to international 
rules. The innocent passage is only concerned with the sea 
territory of the coast state, according to the 1958 UN convention 
on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone.140 As Finland's 
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inner territorial waters extend as far as Märket, on the border to 
Sweden, alien warships cannot sail freely east of Märket. 
The UN 1982 convention on the law of the sea (UNCLOS 
III) decided on free "transit passage" in international straits. The 
Kvarken straits could be considered an international strait. Transit 
passage is freer than innocent passage, and permits e.g. 
submarines to pass under surface. As the waters east of Märket 
have for long been inner territorial waters, transit passage cannot 
be applied there. Whether transit passage could be applied west 
of Märket, in Swedish sea territory, depends on the interpretation 
of the article on exceptions in the UNCLOS III. However, Finland 
and Sweden have announced that they do not consider that 
transit passage applies to the southern part of the Kvarken straits, 
and this interpretation has indirectly been accepted.'`' In case 
transit passage would be applied, alien warships and submarines 
could sail freely through the Kvarken straits west of Märket into 
the Gulf of Bothnia, even under surface. This would considerably 
increase the demands on sea surveillance in both Finland and 
Sweden and make it more difficult. 
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5.4 The Conventions and the Strategic Position of the Aland 
Islands 
Finland has always attempted to honour any international 
agreements entered into. Also in the case of the conventions 
concerning Aland it has always been a matter of principle to 
follow the provisions. Even in a future crisis, Finland is likely to 
observe the provisions in the conventions. Finland's course of 
action in a crisis could thus be foreseen through the conventions. 
What do the conventions permit? In appendix 1 there is a 
compilation of the obligations and the possibilities to control and 
defend the islands, according to the conventions.'42 On the whole 
it might be said that the conventions' excemption clauses are 
fairly flexible. The conventions provide no such obstacle to the 
control of the area, that they could be considered to increase the 
risk of ,violations against the islands. 
One "special" or "exceptional circumstance" that could not 
be foreseen in 1921, but that in the present strategic situation 
would probably be a first-rate question, is the threat against the 
islands' air territory. A strengthening of the air surveillance and 
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defence in the area could in a growing crisis be one of the first 
measures to counter a threat against the area's neutrality. 
Both the convention of 1921 and the treaty of 1940 still limit 
Finland's possibilities to prepare the islands' defence. 
Nevertheless it is presumed that in case of an attack Finland is 
able to defend the islands. Thus there is a certain paradox in the 
provisions. Björkholm-Rosas find that an attack must have taken 
place before Finland can take measures.143 The question is , 
whether measures after an attack are sufficient to convince external 
powers that Finland is capable of defending the islands. 
The crucial question may therefore be when the attack is 
considered to have taken place. The term "attack" has not been 
exactly defined in the conventions. The way crises develop and 
the general behaviour in a crisis have changed much since 1921. 
The Finnish Parliamentary Martial Law Committee in 1988 
considered that an armed attack (generally, Aland is not 
mentioned particularly) does not necessarily require the use of 
weapons in the traditional sense. According to the Committee, a 
defender need not wait to let an aggressor increase its attack 
force, as waiting could reduce the effectiveness of the defence.'' 
The principle must reasonably apply also in the case of Aland. 
Today, when a drawn-out crisis is considered more probable 
than a straight-out war'45, the provisions make it more difficult to 
fulfill the defence obligations. In a crisis situation it is mainly the 
task of the Finnish authorities to estimate when the conventions' 
excemption clauses could and should be applied. If such a decision 
is delayed too long, there might be an increased risk of external 
powers questioning Finland's ability to defend the integrity of its 
own territory. In such a case the conventions might increase the 
risk of the islands being drawn into a military conflict. The 
Swedish defence planning estimates that the defence efforts 
should in the first hand be directed at a so called strategic surprise 
attack, which is made unexpectedly at an early stage of a crisis, 
using regular forces directly from their peacetime deployment.146 
In the case of Aland it could be said that an attack of this character 
would be the most likely alternative, once the aggressor has 
made its decision to attack Sweden or Finland. This is the case as 
the islands can at an early stage be occupied with a fraction of the 
troops needed to break down an organized defence. The islands' 
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geographic position offers an aggressor such advantages that it 
may very well take the chance - once it has made the decision on 
taking the considerably greater chance involved in an armed 
attack against Sweden or Finland. The fact that an attack against 
Aland always constitutes an attack on Finland could be a factor 
deterring a presumptive attacker, if the attack is directed against 
Sweden. Thus Aland could be spared an attack, if the aggressor 
wants to keep Finland out of the crisis at any cost. 
Finland's new Emergency Act entered into force in 
September 1991. The powers granted in the law are enacted by 
decree when a state of emergency is considered to prevail. A 
state of emergency arises from i.a. an armed attack, a threat of 
war or a serious violation of the border, a war or a threat of war 
involving the neighbouring countries. Under these conditions 
the Government can increase the authorities of the defence forces 
in certain areas.'`" The Emergency Act makes the Aland question 
easier in the respect that it gives the Government a framework 
within the law for decisions on measures to defend Aland. 
A transfer of troops to the islands could also increase the 
tension, if the operation is considered to disrupt the balance 
between the great powers in the area. In that respect the 
denunciation of the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and 
Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union gave Finland greater 
freedom of action, as a strengthening of Aland's defence cannot 
even formally be interpreted as a concession to the interests of an 
external power. The conventions allow assistance from external 
powers for the defence of the Aland Islands. The signatory powers 
to the convention of 1921 can give military assistance for the 
defence of Aland's neutrality, provided that the assistance is 
given under Finnish control. 
A denunciation of the conventions does not seem likely, 
either, although there is much to indicate that the provisions are 
out of date. The conventions have been satisfactory in peacetime, 
and have not been an obstacle to Finland's ability to control the 
area. A change in the status quo often brings with it so many 
uncertainty factors that a denunciation of the conventions does 
not seem likely in peacetime. The Finnish defence command has 
proposed advance storage of defence equipment18, which is not 
likely to disrupt the situation in the Baltic Sea as a whole, but 
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instead to make it considerably easier for Finland to prepare for a 
credible defence of the islands in a crisis. 
One interesting question is how the parties involved in a 
crisis would respect Aland's neutrality in case of war. There are 
two kinds of experiences from the Second World War. An opinion 
that has often been expressed is that the conventions spared 
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Aland from major actions of war.149 This view hardly corresponds 
to the picture that history has given of Hitler's and Stalin's 
aptitude to observe international law or adopted conventions, 
but should rather be seen as an attempt to overstress the 
significance of the conventions in retrospect. In strategic 
evaluations the strategic advantages are most often given priority 
over principles of international law. The question whether 
somebody might consider violating these principles depends on 
what strategic advantages are to be gained, and whether these 
advantages surpass the disadvantages of violating the agreements. 
From a strategic point of view a legalistic treatment of the subject 
is not decisive, as it is unlikely that the parties involved in a crisis 
would put legal principles before cold strategic facts. To quote 
the advice given by J.K. Paasikivi to the Finnish Government 
during the Aland negotiations in autumn 1940: "Please avoid 
unnecessary legal finesse, the Gremlin is no rural district court".150 
Characteristic of Finland's trust in the neutrality of the islands on 
the brink of the Continuation War in 1941 was that Finland 
transferred troops to Aland only three days before the war offically 
broke out, giving as an explanation that there was a war affecting 
the Baltic Sea."' There were no protests from the signatory states. 
The most effective protection the conventions provide 
probably is the fact that through the conventions the islands are 
indirectly protected by a large number of signatory states. A 
violation of the conventions would involve the signatory states 
and give them a formal reason to intervene in a conflict to help 
Finland. An interesting question is thus what risk an aggressor is 
prepared to take in relation to the other signatory states. An 
unwillingness to violate the "droit de regard" of another signatory 
state might raise the threshold for an attack. 
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5.5 Influence of Aland's Autonomy on the Islands' Strategic 
Position 
Aland's autonomy, or at least the Ålandic separatism, have 
been of strategic significance on several occasions. The Aland 
issue in 1918-21 had its origins in Aland's attempts to be annexed 
to Sweden. The local resistance against the Stockholm Plan in 
1939 resulted ina failure of the attempts to introduce military 
service on Aland in connection with the defence of Aland.152 
Thus Aland's autonomy became of strategic significance when 
the actions taken by the autonomy authorities influenced the 
attempts to change Aland's military status. The debates in recent 
years also touched upon the role of the autonomy in relation to 
the conventions. 
The Autonomy Act for Aland was enacted in 1921 and 
renewed in 1951 and again in 1993. The purpose of the Autonomy 
Acts has been - and still is - to guarantee the protection of the 
Alandic minority against the rest of Finland. The Autonomy Act 
has been passed by Parliament with application of the procedure 
prescribed for acts with constitutional status. An amendment of 
the Act must also be accepted by the Aland Parliament in order 
to enter into force. Thus the protection for the Alandic minority 
is strong. 
The Autonomy Act gives the Aland Parliament the right to 
decide about internal Aland matters, such as health care, internal 
traffic, education and police matters and about the maintenance 
of order and public safety, with the exception of matters 
concerning the security of the nation. In addition, conventions 
with external powers touching upon the provisions in the 
Autonomy Act, must be ratified by the Aland Parliament in 
order to enter into force in the province. During the negotiations 
in the winter of 1994 about Finland's membership in the EU, 
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Aland and Finland thus reached all their most important goals 
about ,special treatment for the province, as Aland could have 
chosen to remain outside the EU even though Finland became a 
member. The Autonomy Act further stipulates that the foreign 
and defence administration and the maintenance of national 
security is handled by the national authorities. On the other 
hand, persons having obtained regional citizenship are exempt 
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Åland, from military service.7 S3 There are, however, conscripts on A
who have moved to the islands, and there have been military 
refresher courses with purely "Alandic".154 
The autonomy authorities have on their own accord taken 
an active part in questions considered to be related to Aland's 
demilitarized status. Although the conventions do not mention 
the autonomy authorities among the authorities responsible for 
monitoring the demilitarization, these have since the end of the 
1980's considered that the monitoring is part of their area of 
responsibility.1i5 This is underlined, as the League of Nations can 
no longer guarantee the convention. Also in other matters 
concerned with the promotion of peace in the neighbouring 
areas, the autonomy authorities on Aland have been active. For 
instance, several Russian politicians have been given information 
about possible solutions of minority problems, and of Aland's 
experiences.156 
During the last years the Finnish military activities have 
been the subject of much discussion. Between 1986 and 1991 the 
current issues have included the air force's flights over the islands, 
the navy's visits, and the coast guard's use of warning fire against 
unknown under-water objects. Between 1991 and 1994 the debate 
has been more concerned with Aland's demilitarized position as 
a whole.15' 
One reason for the debates has been an attempt to underline 
Aland's sovereignty."' A visible military presence is not 
considered to be consistent with the "autonomous islands state" 
generally aimed at. Another reason probably is the fear of an 
increased influence of the Finnish language. Finland and the 
Finnish language are seen as a bigger concrete threat against 
Aland's autonomy than external military threats, which are 
difficult to define.159 Thus a visible military presence is regarded 
more as a moral threat against Aland's autonomy than as a 
protection against an outside threat. As the conventions limit the 
Finnish military presence, they are from the Alandic point of 
wiev seen as a complement to the autonomy. The debaters on 
Aland in several contributions have equated the conventions 
with Aland's autonomy. To the same extent they express a fear 
that the intention of an increased military presence would be to 
reduce the autonomy.160 In the same way the conventions have 
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also been used as a weapon against the Ålanders in anti-Åland 
contributions to the debate in Finland.161 In the light of these 
attacks, the Alanders' concern for the conventions becomes more 
understandable. 
The debate has also been influenced by the peace movement 
in the 1980's. The still much-used term "the Islands of Peace" 
was coined more or less at the same time as the Soviet Union 
launched its propaganda campaign about "the Sea of Peace" in 
the early 1980's, as an attempt to create a "Mare Clausum" and 
thereby a military hegemony in the Baltic Sea. The proximity 
both in terms and in time can hardly have been a coincidence. 
The fact that the term is still much used is probably more due to 
the fact that the arguments serve the purposes of the autonomy 
than to a large Alandic support for the peace movement, more or 
less extinct elsewhere. A positive, or at least interested attitude to 
the defence issue was also evident during the visit of the gunboat 
Turunmaa in 1988.162 The pro-defence opinion is more wide-
spread than what might be believed in the light of the media. 
One of four Alanders answering an inquiry in 1987 thought that 
military service for Alanders would increase security while 35 % 
thought that an Alandic complement to the defence could partly 
increase security. Finland's possibilities to defend Aland were 
considered to be bad by 46 %, and good by only 25 %. As many 
as 93 % found the demilitarization to be a positive thing, but only 
24 % thought that it reduces the risk of Aland being drawn into a 
military conflict. An interesting question is how the discussions 
during recent years have influenced the opinions. 
From a legal point of view the conventions have nothing to 
do with the autonomy. Strategically, the autonomy should be of 
no significance either. But if the autonomy authorities acquire 
real influence over the conventions and influence Finnish military 
decisions, the actions of these authorities can become strategically 
significant. 16' An amendment of the conventions does not seem 
likely in the present situation. Should an amendment become 
current, there would probably be much local opposition in Aland. 
Thus the autonomy authorities could again become strategically 
important, as was the case in 1939. 
The relations between the Finnish defence command and 
the autonomy authorities have been good, even if they have been 
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strained by the discussions and differences on interpretations 
during recent years. Information channels have been established 
between the defence authorities and the autonomy authorities. 
In order to keep up the good relations, the defence forces have 
endeavoured to give the autonomy authorities advance 
information of training flights and naval movements. 
The Autonomy Act stipulates that laws and decrees 
concerning the declaration of a state of war are to be issued by 
the national legislative authorities. But the Emergency Act and 
the Act on State of Defence treat Aland on the same basis as the 
rest of Finland, and permit restrictions in the rights of the local 
authorities." As these acts are only applicable in a crisis and in 
separately defined areas, where exceptional measures are strictly 
necessary, such a measure would hardly be a violation of the 
demilitarization conventions, if the measures are taken to protect 
the neutrality of the Aland zone. 
As a result of the increased autonomy, the opinion in Aland 
is no longer for an annexation to Sweden or for total independence 
for Aland.165 Greater autonomy probably does not increase or 
diminish Aland's strategic position, as long as it cannot be 
considered to reduce Finland's possibilities to defend the islands. 
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6 ALANDS STRATEGIC 
SIGNIFICANCE FOR VARIOUS 
ACTORS IN THE BALTIC SEA 
REGION 
6.1 Significance for Finland 
The purpose of the Finnish security policy is to prevent the 
country from being drawn into a conflict or a conflict from being 
extended to Finnish territory. From a military point of view the 
decisive thing is that Finland is expected to be able to control and 
defend its territory.166 
During the last decades Lapland, southern Finland and the 
entire air space have been the strategically most important areas 
to Finland. The present strategic development does not change 
this state of affairs, although the focus has recently somewhat 
shifted towards the south of Finland. In 1990 Aland was for the 
first time mentioned as a fourth, separate core area.167 The shifting 
of the strategic focus in the Baltic Sea also increases external 
interest in Aland. This may increase the demands on Finland to 
maintain a credible control and defence capability. If the capability 
is not credible, this can easily lead to speculations about the 
control of the area. This again may have as a consequence that 
several parties include Aland in their own military plans — 
offensive or defensive — or for preventive purposes. 
In this respect Aland's significance for Finland could be 
compared to that of Lapland. Although Aland — just as Lapland — 
is not in itself crucial to the defence of Finland, there is great risk 
that Finland could be drawn into a conflict for reasons involving 
the area in question. Throughout history Aland's strategic 
significance has depended on a potential threat that the islands 
might be used against a third party. It is in the Finnish interest to 
guarantee that such a threat does not arise, as it would draw 
Finland, too, into the conflict. 
The conventions on the demilitarization and neutralization 
of Aland have been a means of preventing the islands from being 
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used against a third party. The problem is that the conventions in 
the present situation hold no guarantees, except the hope that 
the parties concerned will follow the stipulations. In peacetime 
the problem is not likely to arise, as the conventions do not limit 
Finland's ability to control the area. 
In a crisis, however, the stipulations in the conventions 
may not be in balance with the threat-perceptions arising from 
the present strategic position and military technological 
development. The measures in the face of a crisis must be flexible 
and correspond to the prevailing threat-perception, without over-
or underreactions, that might aggravate the situation. Thus it is 
crucial that Finland already in peacetime demonstrates its 
willingness and ability to control and, if need be, defend the 
islands. A drawn-out legal argument of what the conventions 
allow and what they prohibit in a crisis is irrelevant, as it is 
unlikely that the conventions would go before vital national 
interests, should there be a conflict between these. Any probable 
action in a crisis must therefore be evaluated on strategic 
principles rather than legal ones. 
When estimating Finland's possibilities to defend Aland it 
must be noted that today's arms technology no longer requires 
time-consuming fortifications. An effective defence can also be 
based on mobile, accurate and long-range weapons systems that 
can function independently of the limitations set up in the 
conventions. However, a defence of this character requires 
detailed planning, training and knowledge of the area. For full 
effect advance stocks of key materials would be needed to 
guarantee rapid and undisturbed execution in a surprise situation. 
The need for preparation is accentuated by the fact that Finland 
does not have military capacity to take the islands back if an 
attacker gets there first. This weakness may in itself increase the 
risk for a surprise attack. 
In one respect the conventions could protect Aland, despite 
the lack of external guarantees. It is in the interest of the other 
signatory states that the conventions are followed, and this could 
have a deterring effect on an attacker. Also the risk that one of 
the signatory states could use a violation of the conventions as a 
reason to intervene in a conflict in the Baltic Sea area could deter 
from an attack, if the usefulness of the islands is considered less 
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than the harm an escalation could cause an attacker. 
Finland's actions in relation to the conventions could, in 
case of a crisis between the superpowers, increase tension in the 
area, if any measures taken or not taken could be interpreted as 
concessions to either party. Thus it is important that Finland can 
be expected to defend the area alone, without help from an 
outside party. In an evolving crisis an outside power could also 
test Finland's standpoint to the conventions e.g. by using some 
pretext to demand access to the islands for one or more warships 
or military aircraft. In such a situation only a strict reference to 
the obligations according to the conventions in respect of foreign 
military forces could prevent Finland from being drawn into the 
crisis. 
A visible presence, even within the limitations of the 
conventions, can curb any speculations about the defence of the 
islands in a crisis. In that respect it could be said that the so-
called gunboat debates and "revelations" about "the secret 
defence of Åland"'bs favour Finland's cause, as attention is drawn 
to the presence. This providing that the debates are not considered 
to limit Finland's freedom of action. But so far the debates have 
not changed the military pattern of action, except increasing the 
information to the local authorities. 
The conventions have also been seen as a means of 
strengthening Aland's autonomy. Linking the conventions to 
the autonomy is infelicitous in the respect that the debate about 
Aland's autonomy on the one hand and Aland's strategic 
significance to Finland on the other can easily be confused. This 
can have undesirable consequences both for Aland and for 
Finland as a whole. Partly the distrust of the autonomy may 
increase in the rest of Finland, and partly the debates may raise 
doubts about Finland's possibilities to defend the area, as they 
have often given a restricted view of the means to defend Aland 
permitted by the conventions. 
Beside the fact that Finland could be drawn into a crisis 
because of Aland, the area also has strategic significance for 
Finland's total defence. Our foreign trade depends on shipping 
to 85 %. During a crisis it is likely that the dependence on 
shipping would become even greater. At the same time Aland's 
significance would increase, as the character of inner sea would 
61 
have to be maintained for keeping up shipping on the sheltered 
routes to Sweden. 
Aland also has great strategic significance for the military 
defence of Finland. The Gulf of Bothnia is today a military inner 
sea to Sweden and Finland. As long as that state of affairs remains 
unchanged, Finland can keep the military preparedness in the 
area at a lower level and concentrate its resources to the strategic 
core areas. 
Finnish and Swedish participation in European integration 
can in the future result in a common security and defence policy 
within the framework of the EU and WEU. This could lead to 
intensified security and defence co-operation in the Baltic Sea 
and also provide a basis for defence co-operation between Finland 
and Sweden in questions of mutual interest. Such an interest 
0 
could be the defence of the Aland constriction. Both countries 
could co-ordinate their defence efforts in order to be able to carry 
out the defence of the Aland constriction and the safeguarding of 
Aland's neutrality, should the need arise. The development in 
arms technology can offer new possibilities for Finland and 
Sweden to make the defence of the islands more effective, each in 
its own territory, independent of the limitations stipulated in the 
conventions. With the present (and future) long-range weapons 
systems a co-ordinated defence, similar to the Stockholm Plan of 
1939, could be achievable, even without modifications in the 
present conventions. The defence could be complemented with 
the development of amphibious units, similar to the Swedish 
amphibious battalions, which have a capacity to deny an attacker 
access to Aland even if the islands were occuppied despite all. 
Aland could also provide a base area for the naval forces 
when warding off naval attacks against southern Finland. The 
archipelago in Aland and south-western Finland is suitable for 
small naval units which, using today's arms technology and 
sheltered by the archipelago, could constitute a considerable 
threat against an aggressor. Aland is also well situated to 
complement the Finnish air-warning service. If mobile air-warning 
radar is deployed in the area, the range of the surveillance could 
be extended. 
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6.2 Significance for Sweden 
Åland has been a defence problem for Sweden since 1808. 
During the Second World War the islands were included in both 
German and Russian attack plans against eastern Sweden. It is 
characteristic of the islands' strategic significance for Sweden 
that this probably protected Aland from a German attack in 1944 
and led the victors to decide to carry on the demilitarization of 
Aland in 1947. Since 1951, when the dispute about the Aland 
Guarantee Act was a current topic, there have been few Swedish 
standpoints on Aland, with the exception of a few contributions 
during recent years.169  
The question of the conventions' significance for Sweden is 
interesting, considering that they mainly resulted from Swedish 
interests. There were hardly any Swedish comments on the Aland 
"gunboat debates". The few remarks offered supported the 
Finnish military presence in the area10, but as a rule the proposals 
made by admiral Visa on a revision of the conventions were 
rejected, with the somewhat cryptical addition that it was 
presumed that Finland would be able to defend the islands despite 
this."' It is in Swedish interest that Finland can guarantee the 
area's integrity. In this respect a restricted interpretation, limiting 
Finnish military activities, would no longer be compatible with 
Swedish interests.172  
The denunciation of the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation 
and Mutual Assistance has also had effect on Aland's significance 
for Sweden. A strengthening of the defence of Aland, in 
combination with negotiations about military assistance according 
to the treaty would hardly have been compatible with Swedish 
interests. Sweden's interest in the language minority in Aland is 
also said to have diminished.13 The denunciation of the treaty 
should thus have put an end to the last doubts in connection 
with a possible strengthening of the defence of Aland. 
The long-lasting Swedish silence in matters concerning 
Aland was probably due to consideration for Finland's situation. 
As Finland has now gained more scope for its security policy, an 
increasing interest in the issue might be expected in Sweden. 
This does not mean that Sweden would necessarily favour a 
revision of the conventions, as such a measure would probably 
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be difficult to implement."' It is satisfied as long as Finland is 
considered to be able to guarantee Aland's integrity with the 
present procedures. In an aggravated situation it is in the Swedish 
interest that Finland can defend the area and prevent it from 
becoming a threat against Sweden. Thus it is likely that Sweden 
would also accept, or even require that Finnish defence measures 
be set up in time. 
In order to evaluate Aland's strategic significance for 
Sweden we must start out from the potential threat that the 
islands could constitute against Sweden. In 1943 Aland was 
included in attack plans against Sweden. After the war the Soviet 
Union presumedly had attack plans against Sweden. In that case 
Aland could still be the "gun" that already in the 19th century 
was considered to be aimed at Sweden. The Gulf of Bothnia is 
not a military focus area for Sweden, nor is it for Finland. If this 
situation is to remain unchanged Aland is of crucial importance 
for both Sweden and Finland. 
The Swedish defence decision in 1992 amounted to a 
considerable reduction in the number of army brigades. The 
Swedish military historian Bertil Stjernfelt points at a similar 
situation in 1925, when Sweden reduced the number of troops 
the previous time. Fewer troops required a tactic which stresses 
the control of key areas. Aland can definitely be considered to be 
a key area for the defence of Sweden. Therefore it is probable that 
arms reductions in Sweden increase the Swedish interest in Aland. 
The defence decision in 1925 indirectly resulted in the Aland 
plan in the 1930's, which would have implied military co-
operation between Finland and Sweden."' 
In connection with submarine violations on the Swedish 
coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, the media in Sweden claimed that 
alien submarines had used the Alandic waters to make their way 
into the Gulf of Bothnia. For the Swedish defence it is crucial that 
the Alandic waters do not constitute an uncontrolled and 
undefended region. This makes great demands on Finland to 
secure the area's integrity, as a failure would imply a threat not 
only against Finland but also against Sweden. 
Also the air space over Aland is of great significance for 
Sweden. According to the Swedish doctrine the air force should 
cause an attacker losses as far from Swedish territory as possible.16 
To Sweden the Baltic Sea is a protective zone 200 km deep. 
Should Aland fall into the hands of a power hostile to Sweden, 
the protective zone will be reduced to 40 km. If Finland could not 
protect the air space over Aland and prevent it from being used 
for attacks against Sweden, it is likely that the Swedish air force 
would extend its air defence to include the islands. The vicinity 
to Stockholm, 100 km, seems to imply that the islands could be in 
"lee" of the Swedish air defence even in a normal situation. 
Regardless of this it is important that Finland as a neutral and 
independent state can guarantee that its air territory does not 
constitute a threat against a third party. 
6.3 Significance for the WEU 
Finland's observer status in the WEU is the first step towards 
security policy co-operation with western Europe. In case of full 
membership both Finland and the WEU would be facing a new 
situation, and give the WEU 1400 kilometers of land border 
against Russia and a naval contact area in the Baltic Sea. 
It is an interesting question whether a development of the 
WEU could give the conventions, particularly the convention of 
1921, new currency. If most of the signatory powers Germany, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Italy, Latvia, 
Poland and Sweden were members of the WEU, the Union could 
guarantee the neutralization of the Aland zone according to 
Article 7.I in the convention. In an aggravated international 
situation in the Baltic area an aggressor would then be unlikely 
to give the signatory powers/the WEU a reason to intervene in 
the conflict by attacking Aland. 
During the civil war in the former Yugoslavia the WEU 
together with NATO and the UN has helped to lead peace-
keeping operations and to set up trade embargos in the Adriatic 
Sea. Should the development in the former Soviet Union 
degenerate into an armed conflict, the WEU could have similar 
tasks also in the Baltic Sea. In such a situation Aland's central 
position in the Baltic area could become very important for the 
implementation of an operation. 
6.4 Significance for the CIS and Russia 
Åland has played an important part in the strategy of Russia 
and the Soviet Union. During the Tsar era the islands played the 
role of furthest outpost in "the sea fort of Peter the Great" during 
two separate periods. At that stage the islands mainly had 
significance for naval strategy, as a flank protection a&ainst attacks 
on St. Petersburg. During the Second World War Aland might 
during the first stage of the German attack have constituted a 
threat against the Soviet Baltic Fleet. In practice Aland's 
significance for the Soviet Union was mainly limited to a political 
weapon to isolate Finland from Sweden."' 
Even so, the Russian-Soviet interest in Aland cannot be 
bypassed as merely political, as indicated by the recently 
discovered Soviet attack plans. The Soviet Union on several 
occasions claimed that it had greater interest in the islands than 
Sweden. During the 1940's and 50's the Soviet interest in the 
islands decreased as the strategic focus in the area was located 
further south, by the straits of Denmark. In the present situation, 
after the Russian withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the Baltic 
States, the character of the Baltic Sea has changed from almost 
being a Soviet inner sea to a potential military front-line. Thus 
we are nearly back at the strategic situation of the 1930's, with a 
Russian superpower confined to the innermost part of the Gulf 
of Finland, with the exception of the bases in Kaliningrad. Russia 
traditionally fears that the Baltic Sea could be used as an attack 
route against St. Petersburg. Thus the significance of the northern 
Baltic Sea is likely to increase in Russian military planning. From 
a Russian ,point of view it is important that southern Finland, 
including Aland, does not constitute at threat against vital Russian 
interests. 
The main difference in Russia's strategic interests as 
compared to the 1970's is the growing significance of the arctic 
area of the Scandianvian countries and the Kola peninsula. The 
bases on the Kola peninsula play an growing central part in 
Russia's security systems and at the same time they are a 
guarantee for Russia's continued status as a superpower. The 
Gulf of Bothnia demarcates the flanc of the area. Aland's 
significance as a protection for this flanc can increase in an 
aggravated situation, not least for Russia. 
The former Soviet Union saw the cruise missiles as a great 
threat. Highly placed Soviet military sources pointed out that 
they were not going to wait for the missiles to enter their air 
territory, but that they could be warded off in neutral air space, 
in case these countries were not able to ward them off. Both 
Finland and Sweden took these statements seriously and strived 
to build credible air defences to reduce the risk of being drawn 
into a crisis between the superpowers. As the air space over 
Aland cannot be considered to be an exception, the same demands 
have been made on the area's air defence. 
The Soviet Union took a controversial view on the 
conventions. Russia has been seen as the Soviet Union's successor 
where the conventions are concerned. The Soviet Union never 
officially recognized the convention of 1921"8, although in practice 
the exceptional procedures, which are not mentioned in the treaty 
of 1940, were accepted. In the present situation there is much to 
indicate that Russia is not interested in an revision of the 
conventions, even though it should be in Russian interest that 
Finland is capable of securing that the islands do not constitute a 
threat.179 The disinterest in a revision probably mainly concerns 
the treaty of 1940, where Finland guarantees that the islands will 
not be given into the possession of an alien power. Considering 
the altered situation in the Baltic Sea this guarantee could gain 
new topicality, for instance if Finland becomes a member of the 
WEU. In that case it would benefit the stability in the area if the 
Varantee remained. From a Russian point of view, a demilitarized 
Aland can be preferable in that situation, as the islands would 
then be a "open card". 
6.5 Significance for NATO 
The question of NATO's future has been discussed, i.a. in 
the context of a future European security system. After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union even some members of the CIS 
have stated that they would be prepared to apply for membership 
in the NATO. But there are still so many uncertainties that the 
development is not likely to be rapid. For that reason NATO is 
still seen as a counterpart to the CIS and Russia. 
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After the Second World War Åland has been of little 
significance to NATO, as the superpower strategies and weapons 
technology were concentrated on intercontinental weapons 
systems. During the 1980's NATO became more active in the 
Baltic Sea, which has also been considered to increase the area's 
significance as an intelligence zone. Despite this there is little 
proof that Aland might be of strategic importance for NATO. 
Possession of the area does not offer NATO any advantages that 
could not be achieved by alternative means. The Russian 
withdrawal from the Baltic States has increased the theoretical 
possibilities of using the islands as a point of support. 
0 
From NATO's point of view the conventions concerning 
Aland could be seen as part of the "Nordic balance". The 
conventions were concluded in 1947 with attention to the interests 
of the Western powers. Amendments in the existing conventions 
while the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual 
Assistance between Finland and the Soviet Union was still in 
force could within NATO have been interpreted as a risk of 
increased Soviet influence in the area in case of a crisis. In that 
respect the denunciation of the treaty between Finland and the 
Soviet Union can have given Finland greater freedom of action to 
make the defence of Aland more effective, when necessary. 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union NATO has 
renewed its organization in northwestern Europe. The most 
significant change, involving the setting up of the new command 
structure Allied Forces Northwest (AFNW), was that the Baltic 
Sea was included in the AFNW's operations area. It can also be 
regarded as an advancement of the positions in the Baltic Sea, 
although NATO has played down the significance of the change. 
In a crisis it will probably be in NATO's interest that Finland 
can safeguard her territorial integrity. But if Aland is drawn into 
speculations about the superpower's strategic interests the 
situation might become more complicated and Finland's freedom 
of action could be limited. On the other hand defence preparations 
of sufficient credibility could reduce the risk for such a 
development. 
Aland and its strategic significance has not been much 
discussed in Western sources. The Gulf of Bothnia has been 
supposed to have strategic significance for Soviet operations 
against Norway through Sweden."' During the last few years 
Western interest seems to have grown somewhat. The reflexion 
made by Thomas Ries that the Gulf of Bothnia could be an 
optimal firing area shows that the Gulf of Bothnia could also 
have strategic significance for NATO."' In 1989 the International 
Defence Review underlined Aland's significance as a "Gibraltar of 
the North", which could isolate the Gulf of Bothnia in case Finland, 
Sweden, or an attacker should fortify the islands.1S2 The possibility 
of using Aland as an advanced Soviet air base against Norway 
was mentioned in a Norwegian report on the air strategic situation 
in northern Europe.1S3 Although these suppositions may seem 
imaginative, the growing interest in Aland and the Gulf of Bothnia 
could also be interpreted as a signal from NATO to Finland and 
Sweden to enhance the area's defence. 
Of the NATO member countries Great Britain, Germany, 
Denmark, Italy and France are also signatories to the convention 
of 1921. If Aland was attacked in a conflict NATO or its member 
states could claim their "droit de regard" to intervene in the 
conflict. This could deter an aggressor from attacking the islands, 
if the aggressor judged that the advantages of an occupation 
would not exceed the drawbacks resulting from an intervention 
by NATO or its member countries in the conflict. 
6.6. Significance for the Strategic Situation in Northern 
Europe 
Since the Second World War, international tension has been 
relatively low in northern Europe. The two neutrals, Sweden and 
Finland, have acted as a buffer zone between NATO and the 
Soviet Union. As a result of the "Nordic balance" the area has not 
been a source of tension between the superpowers. The 
neutralization and demilitarization of Aland can be seen as a 
part of this balance between the superpowers, as these were 
confirmed in 1947, mainly due to the Western powers' interest in 
Sweden's position. Finland's assurance of the defence of the 
area, should its neutrality be endangered, is a vital part of that 
balance. 
The strategic environment in the Baltic Sea has now changed 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Russian 
withdrawal from the Baltic States, but many uncertainties still 
cloud the strategic future of the region. In a situation like this it is 
important not to add to the uncertainty by upsetting the prevailing 
conditions. The development in weapons technology may, 
however, to some extent change Aland's strategic position, 
regardless of the wishes of the various parties. The improvement 
of the weapons systems' performance and accuracy may have 
the result that the main problem is not to hit a target but to locate 
it. The protective archipelago in the Baltic Sea could then provide 
cover for long-range mobile weapons systems. This could 
underline the significance of the archipelago - including Aland - 
in the future. At the same time Finland's responsibility to 
safeguard the area's integrity is underlined, if the uncertainty 
factors in the Baltic area are not to increase. A guarantee to the 
effect that Aland neither constitutes a threat nor is threatened 
can therefore be considered in the interest of all parties. 
In the present situation it is possible that the superpowers, 
mainly Russia and NATO, also have other reasons for their lack 
of interest in amending the conventions. Due to the conventions 
Aland is today an "open card". In a potential crisis the 
superpowers can make their own evaluation of the threat that 
the islands might constitute and prepare to meet that threat 
themselves. From Finland's point of view it is thus even more 
important that we are able to prove to the world that we can 
defend Aland ourselves. 
The conventions concerning Aland do not limit Finland's 
possibilities to control the area. But if Finland cannot be expected 
to defend the islands, this might add to the uncertainty in the 
area. Thus it is of utmost importance for all parties concerned 
that Finland really can defend the area in a crisis, and prevent it 
from being drawn into a crisis. This is the best guarantee that 
Aland will not in the future threaten anybody — Finland, a third 
party, or the stability of the region. 
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APPENDIX 
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS TO MILITARY 
ACTIVITIES ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTIONS ON THE DEMILITARIZATION AND 
0 
NEUTRALIZATION OF THE ALAND ISLANDS 
Defence obligations: 
Article 7.II in the convention of 1921 
- Article 1 in the treaty of 1940 
Activities permitted in peacetime: 
Normal situation: 
- Control and safeguarding of the territorial integrity by 
measures taken by the Finnish frontier guards 
- Temporary visits by two Finnish warships 
- Overflights by the Finnish air force 
- Finnish military helicopters in rescue service 
- Temporary visits by one alien warship per country, as 
permitted by Finland 
- Innocent passage of warships through territorial sea 
Men "special circumstances" demand: 
- Temporary stay of more than two Finnish warships, provided 
that their displacement does not exceed 6000 tons. 
When "exceptional circumstances" demand: 
- Temporary stay of an armed Finnish force which is strictly 
necessary for maintaining peace and order. 
Activities permitted in wartime: 
In event of a war affecting the Baltic Sea: 
- Temporary mining in order to safeguard the neutrality of the 
zone, and "strictly necessary" maritime measures for this purpose. 
It should also be pointed out that putting out mines in the strip of 
territorial sea one nautical mile wide outside the demilitarized zone 
is possible irrespective of the conventions. When Finland extends 
its sea territory to 12 nautical miles the strip of non-demilitarized 
territorial sea will grow to nine nautical miles. 
In case of an attack "either against the Aland Islands or across them": 
- Necessary measures to check and repulse the aggressor. 
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DOCUMENTATION 
Convention 30 March 1856 on demilitarization of the Åland 
Islands (French) Transcription 
Au nom de Dieu Tout-Puissant. 
Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande 
Bretagne et d'lrlande, Sa Majesté I'Empereur des Francais et 
Sa Majesté I'Empereur de toutes les Russies, voulant étendre 
å la Mer Baltique I'accord si heureusement retabli entre Elles 
en orient et consolider par lå les bienfaits de la paix generale, 
ont resolu de conclure une Convention et nommé å cet effet: 
Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande 
Bretagne et d'lrlande, le tres-honorable George Guillaume 
Frederic Clarendon, Baron Hyde de Hindon, Pair du Royaume 
Uni, Conseiller de Sa Majesté Britannique en son Conseil Prive, 
Chevalier du tres-noble Ordre de la Jarretiere, Chevalier 
Grand'Croix du tres-honorable Ordre du Bain, Principal 
Secretaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté pour les Affaires Etrangeres, 
et le tres-honorable Henri Richard Charles Baron 
Cowley, Pair du Royaume Uni, Conseiller de Sa Majesté en son 
Conseil prive, Chevalier Grand'Croix du tres honorable Ordre 
du Bain; Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plenipotentiaire de Sa 
Majesté pres Sa Majesté I'Empereur des Francais, 
Sa Majesté I'Empereur des Francais, le Sieur Alexandre 
Comte Colonna Walewski, Sénateur de I'Empire, Grand Officier 
de I'Ordre Impérial de la Légion d'honneur, Chevalier 
Grand'Croix de I'Ordre équestre des Séraphins, Grand'Croix de 
I'Ordre des Saints Maurice et Lazare, décoré de I'Ordre 
Imperial du Medjidyé de premiere classe &a, &a, &a; Son 
Ministre et Secrétaire d'Etat au Departement des Affaires 
Etrangeres, 
et le Sieur Francois Adolphe Baron de Bourqueney, 
Grand Croix de I'Ordre Impérial de la Légion d'honneur et de 
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I'Ordre de Leopold d'Autriche, decore du Portrait du Sultan en 
diamants, &a, &a, &a, Son Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre 
pienipotentiaire pres Sa Majesté Imptiriale et Royale Aposto-
lique: 
et Sa Majesté I'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le Sieur 
Alexis Comte Orloff, Son Aide-de-camp général et General de 
cavalerie, Commandant du quartier général de Sa Majesté, 
Membre du Conseil de (Empire et du Comité des Ministres, 
décoré des deux Portraits en diamants de Leurs Majestés feu 
I'Empereur Nicolas et I'Empereur Alexandre II, Chevalier de 
I'Ordre de Saint André en diamants et des Ordres de Russie; 
Grand'Croix de I'Ordre de Saint Etienne d'Autriche de premiere 
classe, de l'Aigle noir de Prusse en diamants, de 'I'Annonciade 
de Sardaigne et de plusieurs autres ordres étrangers; 
et le Sieur Philippe Baron de Brunnow, Son Conseiller 
privé, Son Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire 
pres la Confederation Germanique et pres Son Altesse Royale 
le Grand Duc de Hesse, Chevalier de I'Ordre de Saint Wladimir 
de premiere classe, de Saint Alexandre Newski, enriché de 
diamants; de l'Aigle blanc; de Sainte Anne de premiere classe, 
de Saint Stanislas de premiere classe, Grand'Croix de I'Ordre 
de l'Aigle rouge de Prusse de premiere classe, Commandeur 
de I'Ordre de Saint Etienne d'Autriche et de plusieurs autres 
Ordres étrangers; 
Lesquels apres avoir echange leurs Pleins-Pouvoirs 
trouves en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des articles 
suivants. 
Article ler.  
Sa Majests I'Empereur de toutes les Russies, pour 
répondre au désir qui lui a été exprime par Leurs Majestés la 
Reine dy Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'irlande et 
I'Empereur des Francais, declare que les Iles d'Aland ne seront 
12 
pas fortifiées, et qu'il n'y sera maintenu ni créé aucun établis-
sement militaire ou naval. 
Article 2. 
La présente Convention, annexée au Traité general 
signe å Paris en ce jour, sera ratifiée, et les Ratifications en 
seront échangées dans I'espace de quatre semaines ou plus 
tot, si faire se peut. 
En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs I'ont 
signée et y ont apposées le sceau de leurs armes. 
Fait å Paris le trentieme jour du mois de Mars de Ian 
mil huit cent cinquante six. 
Clarendon 
Cowley 
A. Walewski 
Bourquenay 
Orloff 
Brunnow 
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Reprinted with the permission 
of Ålands kulturstiftelse. 
Convention on non-fortification and neutralization of the Åland 
Islands 20 October 1921 
English translation. 
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1  TRADUCTION. — TRANSLATION. 
No. 255. — CONVENTION 2 RELATING TO THE NON-FORTIFICATION 
AND NEUTRALISATION OF THE AALAND ISLANDS, SIGNED 
AT GENEVA, OCTOBER 20, 1921. 
0//icial text in French. The registration of this convention took place April 6, 1922. 
The President of GERatAxv, His Majesty the Icing of DENMARK and of ICELAND, the Head 
of State of the ESTHONIAN REPUBLIC, the President of the REPUBLIC of FINLAND, the President 
of the FRENCH REPUBLIC, His 'Majesty the King of the UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN 
AND IRELAND and of the BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, Emperor of INDIA, His Majesty 
the King of ITALY, the Head of State of the REPUBLIC of LATVIA, the Head of the POLISH 
STATE, and His Majesty the King of SWEDEN, having agreed to carry out the recommendation 
formulated by the Council of the League of Nations in its Resolution of June 24, 1921, that a 
Convention should be concluded between the interested Powers with a view to the non-fortification 
and neutralisation of the Aaland Islands in order that these islands may never become a cause 
of danger from the military point of view ; 
Have resolved for this purpose to supplement without prejudice thereto, the obligations as-
sumed by Russia in the Convention 3 of March 30, 1856, regardingthe AalandIs lands, annexed to 
Treaty of Paris of the same date ; 
And have appointed the following as their plenipotentiaries 
For GERMANY : 
M. Oscar TRAUTUANN, Counsellor of Legation 
For DEN r.ARK : 
M. Herman Anker BEENHOFT, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at 
Paris, 
and Captain Henri Lucien Erik \VENcit, Chief of Staff of the Danish Navy 
For ESTHONIA : 
M. Antoine PUP, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
For FINLAND: 
General Oscar Paul ExcIELL, Chief of the General Staff of the Finnish Army 
M. Rafael Waldemar ERICH, Former President of the Council of Ministers, Professor in 
the Faculty of Law at the University of Helsingfors ; 
M. Carl ENCKELL, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris ; 
1  Traduit par le Secretariat de la Societe des 	1  Translated by the Secretariat of the League of 
Nations. 	 Nations. 
2 The instruments of ratification of Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, the British Empire 
and Sweden were deposited at Geneva, April 6, 1922 ; those of Italy May r r, 1922, those of 
Poland June 29, r92z and those of Latvia. September 9, 1922. 
1  British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 46, page 23. 
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For FRANCE 
M. Jean GouT,.`Iinister Plenipotentiary of the First Class 
For the BRITISH EMPIRE : 
M. John Duncan GREGORY, C.Il.G., Assistant Secretary of His Britannic Majesty's 
Foreign Office 
For ITALY : 
M. Arturo Ricci BUSATTI, Minister Plenipotentiary of the First Class 
For LATVIA : 
M. Michael WALTERS, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Rome 
For POLAND: 
M. Szymon ASKENAZY, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Delegate 
to the League of Nations 
For SWEDEN 
M. Eric Birger de TROLLE, Provincial Governor, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Baron Erik Teodor Marks von \VvRTEMBERG, President of the Court of Appeal of Svea, 
Former Minister ; 
WVho, having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the 
following provisions : 
Article I. 
Finland, confirming, for her part, as far as necessary, the declaration made by Russia in the 
Convention of March 30, 1S56, regarding the Aaland Islands, annexed to the Treaty of Paris of 
the same date, undertakes not to fortify that part of the Finnish Archipelago which is called " the 
Aaland Islands. " 
Article 2. 
I. The name " Aaland Islands " in the present Convention includes all the islands, islets and 
reefs situated in the stretch of sea bounded by the following lines 
(a) On the North by the parallel of latitude 600 41' north ; 
(b) On the East by the straight lines joining successively the following geographical points 
(I) Lat. 600  41'.o N. and long. 2I 0  oo'.o E. of Greenwich 
(2) » 600  35 .9 N. 	n 	» 	, 2I 0  06'.9 E. 	» 	» 
(3) » 60° 33'.3 N. 	n 	n 2I 0  08'.6 E. 	» 
(4) n 60° 15'.8 N. 	» 	» 2I° 05'.5 E. 	» 	» 
(5) u 6o° II'.4 N. 	» 	n 2I° OO'.4 E. 	n 	» 
(6) » 6o° 09'.4 N. 	» 	» 2I° 0I'.2 E. 	» 	» 
(7) » 600  05'.5 N. 	» 	» 2I 0  04'.3 E. 	» 	n 
(8) » 600  OX' .1 N. 	» 	» 2I° II'.3 E. 	» 	» 	. 
(9) " 590  59'.o N. 	» 	n 2I° o8'.3 E. 	» 
(Io) 	» 59° 53'.o N. 	» 	» 2I0 20'.O E. 	» 	» 
(II) 	» 590 48'.5 N. 	» 	» 2I0 20'.O E. 	» 
(I2) 	» 59° 27'.o N. 	n 	» 2o° 46'.3 E. 	n 
c) On the South by the parallel of latitude 59° 27' North 
N°. a. 
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d) On the West by the straight lines joining successively the following geographical points 
(13) Lat. J90 27'.o N. and long. zon o9'.7 E. of Greenwich 
(14) » 	590 47'.8 N. » 	» 	I9° 40'.o E. » 	» 	 - 
(15) » 	6o° ii' .8 N. » 	» 	x9° 05'. 5  E. » 	» 
(x6) Middle of Market rock 
(» 	6oO 18'.4 N. » 	» 	I9' o8'.5 E. » 	a) 
(17) » 	600 42'.oN. » 	» 	190 14'.4 E. „ 	» 
The lines joining points 24, 25 and x6 are those fixed by " the Topographical Description of 
the Frontier between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Russian Empire in accordance with the demar-
cation of the year x8io, corrected to conform with the revision of 1888. 
The position of all the points mentioned in this Article is generally taken from the British Admi-
ralty map No 2297, dated 2872 (corrected up to August 1921) ; but for greater precision the position 
of points x to ii is taken from the following maps ; Finnish maps No. 32, 1921, No. 29, I92o, and 
Russian map \o. 742, 1916 (corrected in March 2916). 
A copy of each of these maps is deposited with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. 
II. The territorial waters of the Aaland Islands are considered to extend for a distance of three 
marine miles from the low-water mark on the islands, islets and reefs not permanently submerged, 
delimited above ; nevertheless, these waters shall at no point extend beyond the lines fixed in § I 
of this Article. 
III. The whole of the islands, islets and reefs delimited in paragraph I and of the territorial 
waters defined in paragraph II constitute the zone to which the following Articles apply. 
Article 3. 
No military or naval establishment or base of operations, no military aircraft establishment 
or base of operations, and no other installation used for war purposes shall be maintained or set up 
in the zone described in Article 2. 
Article 4. 
Except as provided in Article 7, no military, naval or air force of any Power shall enter or remain 
in the zone described in Article 2 ; the manufacture, import, transport and re-export of arms and 
implements of war in this zone are strictly forbidden. 
The following provisions shall, however, be applied in time of peace 
(a) In addition to the regular police force necessary to maintain public order and security in 
the zone, in conformity with the general provisions in force in the Finnish Republic, Finland may, 
if exceptional circumstances demand, send into the zone and keep there temporarily such other 
armed forces as shall be strictly necessary for the maintenance of order. 
(b) Finland also reserves the right for one or two of her light surface warships to visit the islands 
from time to time. These warships may then anchor temporarily in the waters of the islands. Apart 
from these ships, Finland may, if important special circumstances demand, send into the waters of 
the zone and keep there temporarily other surface ships, which must in no case exceed a total dis-
placement of 6,000 tons. 
The right to enter the archipelago and to anchor there temporarily cannot be granted by the 
Finnish Government to more than one warship of any other Power at a time 
(c) Finland may fly her military or naval aircraft over the zone, but, except in cases of force 
rna eure, landing there is prohibited. 
No. 255 • 
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Article 5. 
The prohibition to send warships into the zone described in Article 2 or to station them there 
shall not prejudice the freedom of innocent passage through the territorial waters. Such passage 
shall continue to be governed by the international rules and usages in force. 
Article 6. 
In time of war, the zone described in Article 2 shall be considered asa neutral zone and shall not, 
directly or indirectly, be used for any purpose connected with military operations. 
Nevertheless, in the event of a war affecting the Baltic Sea, Finland shall have the right, in 
order to assure respect for the neutrality of the Aaland Islands, temporarily to lay mines in the 
territorial waters of these islands and for this purpose to take such measures of a maritime nature 
as are strictly necessary. 
In such a case Finland shall at once refer the matter to the Council of the League of Nations. 
Article 7. 
I. In order to render effective the guarantee provided in the Preamble of the present Conven-
tion, the High Contracting Parties shall apply, individually or jointly, to the Council of the League of 
Nations, asking that body to decide upon the measures to be taken either to assure the observance 
of the provisions of this Convention or to put a stop to any violation thereof. 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to assist in the measures which the Council of the 
League of Rations may decide upon for this purpose. 
WVhen, for the purposes of this undertaking, the Council is called upon to make a decision under 
the above conditions, it will invite the Powers which are parties to the present Convention, whether 
Members of the League or not, to sit on the Council. The vote of the representative of the Power 
accused of having violated the provisions of this Convention shall not be necessary to constitute 
the unanimity required for the Council's decision. 
If unanimity cannot be obtained, each of the High Contracting Parties shall be entitled to take 
any measures which the Council by a two-thirds majority recommends, the vote of the representa• 
tive of the Power accused of having violated the provisions of this Convention not being counted. 
II. If the neutrality of the zone should be imperilled by asudden attack either against the Aaland 
Islands or across them against the Finnish mainland, Finland shall take the necessary measures in 
the zone to check and repulse the aggressor until such time as the High Contracting Parties shall 
in conformity with the provisions of this Convention, be in a position to intervene to enforce respect 
for the neutrality of the islands. 
Finland shall .refer the matter immediately to the Council. 
Article 8. 
The provisions of this Convention shall remain in force in spite of any changes that may take 
place in the present statyas quo in the Baltic Sea. 
Article 9. 
The Council of the League of Nations is requested to inform the Members of the League of the 
text of this Convention, in order that the legal status of the Aaland Islands, an integral part of the 
No. z. 
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Republic of Finland, as defined by the provisions of this Convention, may, in the interests of general 
peace, be respected by all as part of the actual rules of conduct among Governments. 
With the unanimous consent of the High Contracting Parties, this Convention may be sub-
mitted to any non-signatory Power whose accession may in future appear desirable, with a view to 
the formal adherence of such Power. 
Article io. 
This Convention shall be ratified. The protocol of the first deposit of ratification shall be drawn 
up as soon as the majority of the signatory Powers, including Finland and Sweden, are in a posi-
tion to deposit their ratifications. 
The Convention shall come into force for each signatory or acceding Power immediately on 
the deposit of such Power's ratification or instrument of accession. 
Deposit of ratification shall take place at Geneva with the Secretariat of the League of Nations, 
and any future instruments of accession shall also be deposited there. 
In faith whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed this Convention and have annexed their 
seals thereto. 
Done at Geneva, on the twentieth day of October, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-one, 
in a single copy, which shall remain in the Archives of the Secretariat of the League of 'Nations. 
A certified copy shall be sent by the Secretariat to each of the signatory Powers. 
(Signed) 	(L. S.) TRAUTMANN. . 
(L. S.) H. A. BERNHOFT. 
(L. S.) WVENCK. 
(L. S.) ANT. PIIP. 
(L. S.) 0. ENCKELL. 
(L. S.) R. ERICH. 
(L. S.) CARL ENCKELL. 
(L. S.) JEAN GOUT. 
(L. S.) J. D. GREGORY. 
(L. S.) M. RICCI-BUSATTI. 
(L. S.) M. WALTERS. 
(L. S.) S. ASIiENAZY. 
(L. S.) Epic TROLLS. 
(L. S.) E. DI.kuKs VoN W1'ti RTEMBERG. 
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Treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union 11 October 1940 
concerning Aland Islands. 
English translation. 
Treaty 
between Finland and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics concerning 
the Åland Islands. 
The Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government 
of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics wishing to strengthen the founda-
tion of their security and peace in the Baltic Sea, have considered it 
necessary to make the following treaty and for that purpose appointed the 
following representatives: 
The Government of the Republic of Finland: 
The Finnish plenipotentiary in Moscow Juho Kusti Paasikivi; 
The Government of the Socialist Soviet republics: 
The Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the USSR 
and people's Commissar for foreign affairs Vjatcheslav Mihailovich 
Molotov, 
who after having exchanged their letters of attorney, which have been 
found in order, have agreed as follows: 
Article 1. 
Finland pledges to demilitarise the Åland Islands, not to fortify 
them, and not to put them at the disposal of the armed forces of foreign 
states. 
This also implies that neither Finland nor other states, within the 
zone consisting of the Åland Islands may keep or establish any installations 
or bases of operation of a military nature, installations or bases of 
operation of military air forces or any other installations for military pur-
poses, and that the artillery platforms now present on the islands shall be 
demolished. 
Article 2. 
The denomination "the Åland islands zone" in this treaty includes 
all the islands, isles and skerries which are inside the sea area bordered by 
the following lines: 
a) in the North, the latitude parallel N 600  41', 
b) in the East, the straight lines successively connecting the 
following geographical points: 
1) lat 60° 41,0 N and long. 21°00',o E (Gr.) 
2) lat. 60° 35,9 N and long. 21° 06',9 E " 
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3) lat. 600  33',3 N and long. 21° 08,6 E (Gr.) 
4) lat. 60° 15,8 N and long. 21° 05,5 E 
5) lat. 60° 11,4 N and long. 21° 04,4 E 
6) lat. 60°  09,4 N and long. 21° 01',2 E 
7) lat. 60° 05',5 N and long. 21° 04',3 E 
8) lat. 60° 01,1 N and long. 21° 11,3 E 
9) lat. 590  59,0 N and long. 21° 08,3 E 
10) lat. 59° 53,0 N and long. 21° 20,0 E 
11) lat. 59° 48,5 N and long. 21° 20,0 E 
12) lat. 59° 27,0 N and long. 21°  46,3 E 
c) in the South, the latitude parrallel 59° 27N, 
d) in the West, the straight lines successively connecting the 
following geographical points: 
13) lat. 59°27,0 N and long. 27° 09,7 E (Gr.) 
14) lat. 59° 47,8 N and long. 19° 40,0 E 
15) lat. 60° 11,8 N and long.19° 05,5 E 
16) The mid-point of Märket Rock; lat. 60° 18,4 N 
and long.19° 08,5 E (Gr.) 
17) lat.60° 41,0 N and long. 19° 14',4 E (Gr.). 
The territorial waters of the Åland Islands are considered to reach 
to a distance of three nautical miles from those islands, isles and skerries 
which are at least temporarily visible above the sea surface at low water. 
Article 3. 
The USSR is granted right to maintain an own consulate on the 
Åland Islands that beyond usual consular functions supervises the fulfilment 
of the commitments stated in Article 1 in this treaty, concerning the non-
fortification and demilitarization of the Åland Islands. 
In case this consular representative would observe anything that 
according to his views stands in conflict with the stipulations in this treaty 
about the demilitarization and non-fortification, he is authorized to report 
this to the Finnish authorities with the Governmental office in the Province 
of Åland as intermediary for steps to be taken for a joint investigation 
thereof. 
This investigation is to be made by a representative of the Finnish 
government and of the consular representative of the USSR as soon as pos-
sible. 
The results of the joint investigation are to be written down in a 
protocol in quadruple in Finnish and Russian and reported to the govern-
ments of the two signing parties for the taking of necessary steps. 
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Article 4. 
This treaty is in force as soon as it has been signed, and shall 
thereafter be ratified. 
The ratification documents are to be exchanged in Helsinki within 
ten days. 
This treaty is written in two original copies in Finnish and Russian 
in the city of Moscow on the 11th October 1940. 
J. K. Paasikivi 	 V. Molotov 
Source: 
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1856-1992 
Mariehamn 1993 
Reprinted with the permission 
of Ålands kulturstiftelse 
97 



FINNISH DEFENCE STUDIES 
1 Evolution of the Finnish Military Doctrine 1945-1985 
Pekka Visuri, 1990. 
2 Flank or Front: An Assessment of Military — Political 
Developments in the High North 
Tauno Nieminen, 1991. 
3 Non Offensive Defence: A Criteria Model of Military Credibility 
Arto Nokkala, 1991. 
4 Development of Military Technology and its Impact 
on the Finnish Land Warfare Doctrine 
Markku Koli, 1992. 
5 The Impact of Arms Technology on Military Doctrines 
Pertti Salminen, 1992. 
6 The Baltic Republics: A Strategic Survey 
Erkki Nordberg, 1994. 
7 Finlands Security in a Changing Europe: 
A Historiat Perspective 
Risto E.J. Penttilä, 1994 
- 
